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through sovereign support to banks on one hand and banks’ exposures to weak 
sovereigns on the other. After illustrating the main relationships on the recent 
financial crisis, we construct an agent-based network model of an artificial financial 
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calibrated to the real world data using a unique dataset put together from various 
sources. Our analyses yield the following key results: Firstly, in the short term, all 
the support measures improve the systemic stability. Secondly, in the longer run, the 
effects of state support depend on several parameters but still there are settings in 
which it significantly mitigates the systemic crisis. Finally, there are differences 
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Abstrakt 
Tato práce se zaměřuje na vazby mezi krizemi finančního systému a dluhovými 
krizemi jednotlivých států skrze státní pomoc na jedné straně a expozice bank vůči 
státnímu dluhu na straně druhé. Po ilustraci hlavních vztahů na nedávné finanční 
krizi zkonstruujeme multiagentní síťový model finančního systému, který nám umožní 
analyzovat efekty státní podpory na systémovou stabilitu a efekty zpětné vazby, při 
kterých se riziko přenáší ze států zpět na bankovní systém. Nejprve testujeme různé 
parametrizace modelu pomocí Monte Carlo simulací. Následně je model zkalibrován 
pomocí jedinečné sady dat složené z různých zdrojů. Klíčové výsledky naší analýzy 
jsou následující: Zaprvé, v krátkodobém horizontu veškerá opatření na podporu bank 
zlepšují systémovou stabilitu. Za druhé, v delším časovém horizontu závisí účinky 
státní podpory na parametrizaci modelu, ale stále existují nastavení, za kterých 
státní pomoc výrazně zmírňuje systémovou krizi. A konečně, existují rozdíly mezi 
účinky různých typů podpůrných opatření. 
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The recent global crisis started as a crisis of the credit system, continued as a crisis 
of liquidity and with negative sentiment and overall market slowdown, it finally 
transformed into economic crisis. In the earlier stages, the sovereigns took an active 
role, supporting the economic system by bank aid, deposit guarantees, quantitative 
easing and economic stimuli packages. However, large state support for the financial 
system as well as for the economy represents a huge burden on government finances 
and in some cases, mainly in Europe, it has already resulted in sovereign debt crises. 
Moreover, losing their status of risk-free borrowers and facing increasing prices for 
credit, the sovereigns too are now significantly weakened and some are in threat of 
default. Since a large portion of sovereign debt is held by the banking system, there 
is a danger of the crisis feeding back to where it began in a vicious circle of 
transferring the toxic debt back and forth between the sovereign and the financial 
sector. 
Meanwhile, in the new market environment, the survivor banks are struggling to 
restore their profits. Despite the pressure for recapitalization and increased systemic 
safety in form of new regulatory standards, large financial institutions start 
a regulatory race again, as for them the perceived way to advance is to once again 
inflate their balance sheets without worrying about the consequences of their possible 
failure. On the contrary, the recent history taught them that the larger, more 
leveraged and thus more systemically important a bank is, the larger the probability 
of a bailout. Again, the world economy finds itself on the crossroads but this time the 
sovereign states cannot afford to play the guardian role anymore. 
The overall aim of this thesis is to contribute to the discussion on sovereign debt 
crises and bank crises, which has been recently going on both on the EU and the 
international level. It examines the role of the sovereigns, be it as regulatory bodies, 
providers of bank aid or members of the financial network as such. The main research 
question is how the stability of the financial system is affected by its individual 
parameters, mostly those associated with the link between the banks and the 
sovereigns, how and when its stress can translate into sovereign crises and on the 
other hand, how and when a sovereign crisis can feed back into the system through 




i. In the short term, state aid significantly reduces the extent of a financial crisis 
and decreases the number of failed banks.  
ii. In the longer term, as the sovereigns are weakened by the support provided to 
the banks, they may send negative shocks back to the system. Still, in total, 
the system would not be better off without the state aid. 
iii. There are differences among the types of state aid. The direct support is more 
efficient as opposed to the liquidity measures which are only prolonging the 
resolution of the debt crises. 
The thesis is a logical follow-up of our previous research, Klinger (2011) and Klinger 
& Teply (2013), where we used agent-based network simulations to assess the impact 
of various settings of banking regulation on systemic stability. The main idea which 
we employed successfully in our previous research is that the banks may be 
represented by their balance sheets and they form nodes in a network, connected 
with mutual claims. It stems from the recent advances in network modelling of 
financial systems, which are described in more detail later in the following chapters, 
mostly from Nier, et al. (2007). 
The following second chapter will focus on the description of the link between the 
financial institutions and the sovereigns, mostly in regard to the recent financial 
crisis. The third chapter will present the used concepts more rigorously, presenting 
a literature review of the theories behind the main mechanics of our research 
question as well as of the models and modelling techniques that form the grounds 
and inspiration for our analysis. In the fourth chapter, we construct an original 
model of a financial system which will be used for testing the impact of the sovereign 
assistance to banks and researching the feedback loops that may arise when such 
assistance weakens the sovereigns. In the fifth chapter, we test the model thoroughly 
in Monte Carlo simulations to get better understanding of its inner processes and its 
results. In the sixth chapter we calibrate it to a unique dataset collected from various 
sources in order to gain more insight into the current situation and outline some 
practical implications for setting new policies in case of a systemic banking crisis 
happening later in the future. Finally, we close the thesis with a conclusion 




2 The Context of State Aid 
To set the issue of sovereign aid into the current context, the following chapter 
provides a short outline of the recent financial crisis and its individual phases as it 
progressed from its beginning in 2007/2008. 
2.1 The Current Financial Crisis 
The High-level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector 
classifies the development of the recent financial crisis into five phases: “Subprime 
crisis” phase, “Systemic crisis” phase, “Economic crisis” phase, “Sovereign crisis” phase 
and a “Crisis of confidence in Europe phase” (Liikanen, 2012). However, for the 
purpose of describing the interlinkages between the financial system and state sector, 
we identify three main phases of the crisis as presented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: The interconnections among sovereigns and banks 
 
Source: Author based on Caruana (2012) 
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2.1.1 Phase One: Subprime Crisis and Before 
This phase is characteristic with risk build-up and successive rapid deterioration of 
market conditions which stood at the beginning of the recent crisis. It is well known 
that the first shockwaves came from the U.S. subprime mortgage market. However, 
what really can be considered as the cause of the crisis is the development which 
preceded it, and which stretches back to the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system. 
In the times of the Bretton-Woods, the banking practice was heavily regulated. With 
strict controls of cross-border capital flows, the banks operated mostly on the local 
basis and the financial system formed much less complex structure than the one of 
2007. The deposit rates as well as the lending rates were set by strict government 
rules with margins that gave the bankers a solid space for profit and ensured 
systemic stability (Schooner & Taylor, 2009). Moreover, in the reminiscence of the 
Great Depression, there was the Glass-Steagall act that put a Chinese wall between 
commercial and investment banking and several similar legislative acts outside the 
United States.  
However, when the Bretton Woods system fell, apart the environment experienced 
transformation from heavily regulated to highly competitive. Without the heavy 
regulation, competitive pressures were squeezing the interest rate spreads and the 
resulting sharp decline in profit margins caused that the only way for the financial 
institutions to maintain their profit levels was through increasing the scale of 
operations by heavily leveraging their balance sheets (Klinger, 2011). As banks went 
to race for leverage, the credit market completely changed its character and started 
bringing cheap funds to households who begun taking mortgages on a massive scale. 
The steady growth in investment was driving the asset prices upwards and soon it 
resulted in a “Ponzi scheme” where credit could have been granted even to people 
with no income. Meanwhile, to be able to further increase the leverage, the banks 
and mortgage companies started repackaging the loans, slicing and selling them 
across the financial system to other banks and investors in the form of an 
opportunity of a low-risk, high-return investment. Although the role of the sovereigns 
and their governments may not be obvious at the first sight, due to the insufficient 
regulation of the financial institutions and allowing these profound changes to 
happen, these subjects in fact were the crucial part of this development.  
The first signs of problems appeared in 2007 when the unsustainability began to 
surface and the banks began writing off subprime mortgage securities. However, as 
the banks’ situation gradually deteriorated, so did the trust of their investors and 
2 The Context of State Aid 
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lenders. In connection to the need of short-term financing on which the banks laid 
out the foundations of their business models for the last three decades, this provided 
a deadly mix which prepared ground for a much more severe and far-reaching 
systemic crisis. 
2.1.2 Phase Two: Systemic Crisis and State Aid 
The true mark of the systemic crisis outbreak was the failure of Lehman Brothers on 
15 September, 2008. Even though its bankruptcy meant a very significant shock to 
the interbank system, the other reason for the crisis to finally break out was 
psychological. Understanding that state aid is no longer guaranteed even for large, 
systemically important banks, the shares of the banking sector dropped as the 
investors were no longer willing to consider financial institutions as an investment 
opportunity. Moreover, the market of bank debt funding froze and liquidity 
evaporated from the interbank market. The banking system thus found itself in 
a deadlock where it was not able to roll over the short-term debt it used to finance 
most of its operations, but at the same time, the individual institutions held 
unsettled overdue claims against each other. Moreover, due to the increased cost of 
lending and severe credit shocks, the banks’ capital buffers did not suffice to prevent 
the system from collapse. Had they not been replenished, a large portion of the 
banking system would have failed.  
Figure 2: Financial sector support in selected advanced economies, 2008 – Jul 2012 
Panel A: Total direct support Panel B: Unrecovered support – impact on public debt 
Source: IMF (2013a) 
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At this point, the states started playing an active role, introducing a number of 
measures to support the troubled financial institutions. Amongst these measures were 
strengthening of the deposit insurance, state guarantee schemes, outright bail-outs for 
bank recapitalisation or loans to alleviate the severe lack of liquidity (Liikanen, 
2012). Mostly in Europe, several states introduced bad loan buy-outs or complete 
bank nationalizations (Petrovic & Tutsch, 2009). According to Panetta, et al. (2009, 
p. 1), “…the magnitude of the action taken to support the banking system has been 
unprecedented.”  
Figure 2 shows the financial sector support in advanced countries as a fraction of the 
2012 GDP along with its recovery values. The top rank in terms of GDP fraction 
belongs to Ireland followed by Greece. In March 2013, Cyprus bailed out its banks 
using the EUR 10 billion in funds provided by the European Central Bank and 
International Monetary Fund as the fifth European country to receive such assistance 
(ECB, 2013). The United Stated managed to recover almost 90% of the provided 
funds. Moreover, Figure 3 providing the detailed break-down of support to the 
financial sector for the EU27 countries shows that in absolute terms, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom invested the largest amounts in their financial systems.  
Figure 3: Used amounts of aid to financial institutions, 1 Oct 2008 – 1 Dec 2011 
 
Source: Author based on data from EC (2012) 
As to the effects of the state aid, in the short run, the support measures definitely 
had a positive impact on systemic stability. Panetta, et al. (2009) states that the 
government support managed to lower the banks’ credit default swap (CDS) 
premiums, which is the main indicator of failure risk. The first drop came when 
a support measure was announced and subsequently, the premiums fell even further 
when each of the measures was implemented. Moreover, the larger the amount of 
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funds employed in a support measure, the sharper was the decrease of CDS 
premiums. Finally, there were positive spill-over effects of these measures illustrated 
by falls of CDS premiums in countries other than the one deploying the measure. 
Figure 4 presents the effects of different measures on the CDS premiums of 11 
selected countries. 1 
Figure 4: Effects of state support measures on bank CDS premiums 
 
Source: Author according to Panetta, et al. (2009) 
2.1.3 Phase Three: Sovereign Crisis and the Feedback 
Loops 
However, the above-mentioned support actions proved to be very expensive and 
progressively, the situation started deteriorating for the sovereigns. As the balance 
sheet weaknesses moved from the banks to the sovereigns and the tax revenues 
dropped, the fiscal deficits began to surface. As the individual countries’ 
creditworthiness crumbled and the rating agencies pointed out the associated risks, 
the investors began panicking and losing confidence even in the sovereign states. As a 
result, sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads rose and the access to new funding 
became increasingly more expensive. In a situation like this, when a sovereign 
guarantee is exercised or a large bank needs to be fully or partially bailed out and on 
top of that a country finds itself in an economic downturn, the public accounts are in 
serious trouble. 
 
                                         
1 Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom 
and the United States 
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Figure 5: CDS spreads of selected countries and their respective financial systems 
 
Source: Author based on Caruana (2012) 
Note: CDS for financials are simple averages over a sample of domestic financial institutions 
Unfortunately, the sovereigns did not prove to be anything else than other type of 
agents in the same financial system and thus by transferring the risk on themselves, 
it did not vanish. Instead, it returned in form of feedback loops from the sovereigns 
back to the banks later when the sovereigns found themselves in crisis and their own 
balance sheets were deteriorating. Illustration of impact of such feedback loops is 
provided in Figure 5, where we can observe the CDS spreads of selected sovereigns 
and how they affect CDS spreads of domestic financial systems. According to 
Caruana (2012), these loops may be divided into four key channels: 
i) As a large portion of sovereign debt was held by the same banks that were 
receiving the support, the losses on banks’ sovereign portfolios weakened 
the banks’ balance sheets and led to capital losses. Moreover, due to 
increased counterparty risk, the funding decreased in availability and 
increased in cost; 
2 The Context of State Aid 
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ii) Deterioration in sovereign creditworthiness reduces the value of the 
collateral that banks were able to use for wholesale funding and to obtain 
liquidity from the central bank;  
iii) Rating agencies as well as investors are aware of the impact of the public 
sector on a country’s financial system. Hence, sovereign rating downgrades 
almost always flow through to domestic banks downgrades, further 
worsening their status a borrowers. 
iv) Deterioration in the creditworthiness of the sovereigns also reduces the 
benefits of government guarantees to the banks as these lose value and 
market credibility.  
In this manner, the risk and the losses oscillate between the privately-held banks and 
“publicly-held” sovereigns. However, we argue that from the systemic point of view, 
the state aid plays important positive role during the crisis because it manages to 
dilute the shocks and spread them in time. Finally, it is clear that most of the losses 




3 Theoretical Background 
The following chapter provides a literature review of both the main concepts of state 
help in case of a systemic financial crisis, studies associated with the recent financial 
crisis and the modelling framework which we use further to construct the model of 
the financial system. 
3.1 Sovereign Debt Crises and State Aid 
The current international economic turmoil has highlighted the strong 
interconnection among sovereign debt and bank crises, which came into interest of 
the researchers only very recently, when the sovereign crisis and the crisis of Europe 
started to unfold. Figure 6 demonstrates the part played by public interventions in 
rescuing troubled banks, indicating key implications for public finance.  
Figure 6: Bank’s insolvency and public finance involvement 
 
Source: Author based on Campolongo, et al. (2011) and Teply (2009) 
Note: DGS = Deposit Guarantee Schemes, RF = Resolution Funds 
A bank is insolvent when its capital does not cover incurred losses. In this case two 
main kinds of public support are possible: Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) and 
Resolution Funds (RF), and government support such as capital injections, liquidity 
interventions, asset purchases or guarantees. On the other hand, banks are linked 
with governments in three main ways: sovereign bonds in their portfolios, sovereign 
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bonds used as collateral for operations with central banks and other counterparties, 
and finally through guarantees issued by sovereigns on banks’ liabilities.  
From the onset of the current financial crisis, the topic of sovereign crises came into 
interest of many researchers and numerous publications were written on this topic 
including Manasse & Roubini (2009) who provide an empirical study of the 
conditions leading to a sovereign crisis, Reinhart & Rogoff (2009) who explore the 
history of sovereign countries in individual case studies, Enderlein, et al. (2012) who 
investigate behaviour of governments which find themselves on the verge of default, 
Borensztein & Panizza (2009) who examine possible costs to the defaulting sovereign 
arising from its failure or Dias (2012) who investigates the asynchronization between 
PIIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) and other resilient 
countries in the Eurozone through the minimum spanning tree and the associated 
hierarchical tree analyses. On a related note, Estrella & Schich (2011), develop 
a valuation method of bank debt insurance by troubled sovereigns, Pisani-Ferry 
(2012) describes problems that arise from this linkage to the Euro area, Campolongo, 
et al. (2011) build a  model estimating the probability and magnitude of economic 
losses and liquidity shortfalls occurring in the banking sector. 
However, the literature on sovereign debt crises is not only a matter of the current 
“post-crisis” age as documented by classic works of Bulow & Rogoff (1989b) who 
explore how heavily indebted sovereigns can perform a partial restructuring of their 
debt, Bulow & Rogoff (1989a), who study the contracting issues of lending to small 
countries, Eichengreen & Portes (1995), who draw implications from the Mexican 
crisis or Cantor & Packer (1996), who investigate the what determines sovereign 
rating and what impact the ratings have. Finally, Laeven & Valencia (2008), recently 
updated by Laeven & Valencia (2012), provide a detailed catalogue of systemic 
banking crises along with description of the links they had to the sovereign sector. 
3.2 Used Methodology 
For better understanding of the impact of the link of sovereigns and banking 
institutions on financial system stability, in the rest of the thesis we will be 
constructing, testing and calibrating a model of a virtual financial system. Here, we 
will briefly introduce the basic modelling framework, which is based on two central 
concepts, both of them relatively new and associated with computational economics 
and study of complex systems. These two are network theory and agent-based 
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modelling. Since the core idea of the model presented in this thesis is similar to 
Klinger & Teply (2013) and Klinger (2011), this chapter draws from the description 
of the main concepts which we laid out in these works. 
3.2.1 Network Modelling 
The network theory is particularly useful for description of connected structures and 
the pattern of their relationships, whether these are social networks, the Internet, 
networks of citations of scientific papers, or complex financial systems. We state 
already in Klinger (2011) that a network is a set of nodes connected with edges. 
Defined more rigorously, it is a graph defined as 𝐺 = (𝑁, 𝐸, 𝑓), where 𝑁 is a set of 
nodes (also called vertices), 𝐸 is a set of edges (also called links) and 𝑓: 𝐸 → 𝑁 × 𝑁 
is the mapping function which plots the edges onto individual pairs of nodes (Lewis, 
2009). 
Nodes may represent individual agents, depending on the field we use the network 
approach in. Among others, these are servers and websites when we study computer 
networks or people in case of social networks. In the framework of finance, they may 
represent banks, traders, depositors, companies or whatever else entity which 
constitutes a part of a financial system. Edges may contain more data than just the 
false/true property describing the (non)connection of any two particular nodes in the 
network. What may also matter is the orientation of an edge, defining whether it 
points from node A to node B, from node B to node A or both ways at the same 
time. Also the edges may have different weights, which is a property representing the 
strength of their mutual connections. When, as in our case, the network theory is 
applied to modelling of financial systems, such properties allow us to define the 
creditor/debtor relationships as well as the size of the mutual claims of individual 
banks (Klinger, 2011). Finally, arrangement of the edges is defined by various 
mapping functions, which leads to different network shapes (or topologies), such as 
“random network” where it is decided randomly according to certain predefined 
probability whether an edge will be formed between two nodes or not, “star” where 
all other nodes are connected to one central node or “ring” where each node has 
exactly two edges and there are all the edges are connected into one cluster. 
Comprehensive description of individual topologies and other network properties and 
references to the original research on network theory are provided among others in 
Wilhite (2006) or Lewis (2009). 
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Network theory proved to be a particularly interesting means of studying impulse 
transmissions, which includes transmission of negative shocks. The most illustrative 
example of utilization of this methodology is the advancement of contagion through 
a network of subjects where a small collection of infected nodes may result into 
epidemics.2 Obviously, we can use this methodology also for simulating credit shocks 
in banking systems since when one bank fails and there are no supporting 
mechanisms such as bail-outs or state guarantees, the losses are transmitted to its 
creditor banks. If these creditors’ capital buffers do not suffice to cover the incurred 
losses, in the next lap some of these also default on their obligations while sending 
the shock even further into the system (Klinger, 2011). In Figure 7 depicting the 
mechanism of shock propagation, the propagating banks are coloured grey whereas 
the failed banks are depicted in black.  
Figure 7: Scheme of banking system contagion 
 
Source: Klinger (2011) inspired by Sell (2001) 
3.2.2 Agent-Based Modelling 
Generally, agent based modelling is a bottom-up approach that examines how 
numerous subjects that are each equipped with basic set of behavioural rules are 
interacting in a virtual environment. According to Tesfatsion (2006a, p. 835), “[an 
agent] refers broadly to bundled data and behavioural methods representing an entity 
constituting part of a computationally constructed world.“ The individual agent’s 
actions finally lead to certain aggregate behavioural patterns on the systemic level. 
Probably the most well-known paper is the one by Schelling (1969), who described 
how a simple set of individuals’ preference of the composition of their neighbourhood 
may lead to a pattern of segregation on a systemic scale. On a related note, much 
                                         
2 For information about the field of epidemiology research, see e.g.  Meyers (2007). 
3 Theoretical Background 
14 
 
space was given to agent-based models of financial markets which use simple sets of 
instructions for the individual trading agents, which on a macro level lead to patterns 
that replicate the stylized facts of financial markets (e.g. Lux & Marchesi, (2000)). A 
thorough guidebook to agent-based economics was published by Tesfatsion & Judd 
(2006b) and recently, this approach is being recognized and implemented also in the 
field of systemic stability research. For a demonstration of how well this framework is 
suited for modelling of financial systems, see e.g. Farmer & Foley (2009), or an FSI 
Award winning paper of Jo (2012), in which he analysed contagion risk with an 
agent-based network model. In such models, the agents represent individual financial 
institutions or sovereigns, the basic data they hold are their balance sheets and a set 
of behavioural rules such as when to default, when to sell of a particular amount of 
assets or when to bail out a certain institution.  
3.2.3 Applications for Modelling Banking Systems 
As mentioned in Klinger (2011), the current research applying the previously 
mentioned methods to the field of financial or banking system stability divides into 
two main streams: empirical research and theoretical models. 
3.2.3.1 Empirical Research 
There are several studies that concentrate on the real-world interbank exposure 
modelling, analysing especially the proneness of banking systems to systemic distress 
that results from the effects of contagion. Such studies usually focus on local banking 
networks, for example Boss, et al. (2004), Upper & Worms (2004), Wells (2004), Van 
Lelyveld & Liedorp (2006) or Muller (2006) analyse the banking systems of Austria, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Switzerland respectively. 
Most of the researchers face the problem of virtually non-existent reliable data on 
individual interbank exposures. To address this issue, they commonly turn to the use 
of aggregate banks’ balance sheets and employ the assumption of maximum entropy 
based on the supposition that the individual banks distribute their exposures as 
evenly as possible (Upper, 2011). However, this simplification is unrealistic and 
underestimates the potential of contagion and systemic distress (Mistrulli, 2011). 
3.2.3.2 Theoretical Models 
The theoretical models examine how system behaviour is influenced by its general 
characteristics. The first such model was constructed by Allen & Gale (2000) who 
showed that the structures with more interbank links are more resilient in case of a 
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distress situation. Another early analysis was carried out by Freixas, et al. (2000), 
who studied contagion in systems where some banks were systemically important. 
The simple framework of pure credit shock contagion is extended in Cifuentes, et al. 
(2005) and Shin (2008), who add a market liquidity contagion channel decreasing the 
price of illiquid assets. Finally, there are studies that analyse systemic stability by 
simulation experiments on random networks such as Gai & Kapadia (2010), who find 
that the linkages among banks are absorb the shocks initially but when the severity 
of systemic distress exceeds a certain threshold, they may cause greater instability. 
Our approach will build on such theoretical models and mostly on a paper by Nier, 
et al. (2007), who constructed a simulation model on which they examine how 
different parameters of a banking system affects its resilience. Moreover, we will build 




4 The Model 
For each individual simulation, our model is defined in several steps. First, the 
network of banks and sovereigns is initialized together with the balance sheet data of 
individual agents. Second, the system is stressed by several types of balance sheet 
shocks, which may originate from individual banks, individual sovereigns or from 
downward pressure on asset prices. Following the initial shock, the stress propagates 
through the network and may trigger actions of the particular agents such as bank or 
sovereign defaults, asset fire-sales or state assistance to troubled banks. The 
simulation continues in several laps until the initial shocks completely dissolve and 
are not transmitted further onto other agents. The modelling approach inspired by 
Nier, et al. (2007) and Chan-Lau (2010), was first introduced in our previous research 
in Klinger (2011) and Klinger & Teply (2013). In this thesis, we elaborate on the 
model construction3 and add new features such as funding liquidity shocks or 
inclusion of sovereigns in the financial system.  
4.1 Creating the Network 
The infrastructure of the model is formed by a network of banks and sovereigns. 
First, the model creates an interbank network, which is a graph defined by two 
parameters set exogenously at the beginning of each simulation and describing the 
random graph of banks. These are the following: 
1. Node count 𝑁𝑏, determining the number of agents in the interbank network, 
2. Probability 𝑝𝑖𝑗 , with which there exists an oriented edge from bank 𝑖 to bank 
, i.e. the probability that bank 𝑖 is exposed to bank 𝑗 by holding a claim 
against it. We assume this parameter fixed among all edges between all nodes 
𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ (1, … , 𝑁𝑏) and denote it as 𝑝𝑏. As the exposures are not netted, two 
links in opposite directions may exist between each pair of banks. 
                                         
3 Please note that some parts of the basic model infrastructure definition may overlap with (Klinger, 
2011). 
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The interbank network is created in two steps. First, there are 𝑁𝑏 banks added to 
the system, and second, for each oriented pair of banks, an edge is created with 
probability 𝑝𝑏. 
Second, we add the sovereign agents and link them with their domestic banks by 
exposures held by each bank to its home sovereign. We abstract from other types of 
connections such as exposures of states-to-banks, states-to-states or banks-to-foreign-
sovereigns as they would clutter the model with parameters we do not wish to focus 
on. For introduction of sovereigns, the system takes one more exogenous parameter, 
initial node count 𝑁𝑠,𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇 , determining the number of sovereigns. For each bank 
𝑖 ∈ (1, … , 𝑁𝑏), one sovereign 𝑘 ∈ (1, … , 𝑁𝑠,𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑇 ) is sampled randomly and an oriented 
edge is created between these two. The bank-sovereign edges represent claims of 
banks on the domestic sovereign, i.e. the exposure that bank 𝑖 holds to sovereign . 
At the end of the edge initialization, the sovereigns having no links with any of the 
banks are removed from the system and the number of sovereigns left is denoted as 
𝑁𝑠. 
4.2 Initializing the Balance Sheets 
Table 1: Balance sheet variables of a modelled bank 
 𝒂𝒊...TOTAL ASSETS 𝒍𝒊... TOTAL LIABILITIES 
 𝑠𝑖...sovereign debt 𝑏𝑖...interbank liabilities 
 𝑞𝑖...interbank assets 𝑑𝑖...external liabilities (deposits) 
 𝑒𝑖...external assets 𝑐𝑖...net worth (capital buffer) 
Source: Author 
Next, the model builds balance sheets of individual banks for the given network 
realization. First, we calculate the aggregate variables of the system. The total value 
of all assets upon initialization is a sum of:  
a. interbank assets, constituted by all the loans represented by the edges of the 
interbank network, 
b. sovereign debt, constituted by individual banks’ exposures towards their 
domestic sovereigns,  
c. external assets, constituted by individual banks’ exposures outside the 
network, e.g. loans to other entities such as households, foreign sovereigns and 
non-financial institutions or derivatives. 
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The banks’ balance sheets are then populated according to the following algorithm: 
1. The sum of external assets in the system 𝐸, sum of sovereign debt towards all 
banks 𝑆 and the share of interbank assets in total assets 𝜃 are given 
exogenously. The total value of all assets in the system 𝐴 is determined by 
these as follows:	
𝐴 = 𝐸 + 𝑆
(1 − 𝜃)
. 
2. The sum of interbank assets is calculated from the total assets and the share 
of interbank assets in total assets:	
𝐼 = 𝜃𝐴. 
3. In line with Nier, et al. (2007), for Monte Carlo simulation purposes, the 
interbank exposures are assumed homogenous.4 Denoting the sum of all 
interbank edges in the system as 𝑍𝑏, the value of each individual edge is thus 
calculated as:  
 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑏 = 𝑤𝑏 = 𝐼
𝑍𝑏
. 
4. The value of each sovereign’s debt is given as 𝑆 . for Monte Carlo simulations, 
it is assumed homogenous across sovereigns.4 Denoting the sum of outgoing 
edges from banks to -th sovereign as , the value of each individual edge is 
thus calculated as:  
 𝑤𝑘
𝑠 = 𝑆 . 
When the aggregate variables are determined, the model initializes the balance sheets 
of individual banks: 
5. The value of interbank assets (𝑞𝑖) and liabilities (𝑏𝑖) of each bank are 
determined by the interbank edge weight and number of edges in the system 
as: 
 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑤𝑏 𝑧𝑖
𝐼𝑁 , 
𝑏𝑖 = 𝑤𝑏 𝑧𝑖
𝑂𝑈𝑇 , 
                                         
4 In the empirical part they are calibrated according to the real-world data 




𝐼𝑁  is the number of 𝑖-th bank’s incoming edges and 𝑧𝑖
𝑂𝑈𝑇  is the 
number of its outgoing edges.5 
6. The value of sovereign debt held on each bank’s balance sheet (𝑠𝑖) is equal to 
the value of domestic government held by the bank. 
 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑤𝑘
𝑠 , 
7. External assets’ value of each bank is determined by a two-step algorithm 
described in Nier, et al. (2007): 
a. First, the difference between the internal liabilities and internal assets 
is balanced by a certain amount of external assets 𝑒?̃?:	
𝑒?̃? = {
𝑏𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖    if    𝑏𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖 > 0
0             if    𝑏𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖 ≤ 0
 	
b. The rest of the total sum of external assets is distributed uniformly 
among all banks so that the following holds for each bank’s external 
assets value:	
𝑒𝑖 = 𝑒?̃? + [





8. Each bank’s capital buffer (𝑐𝑖) is determined as a share of its total assets (𝑎𝑖) 
according to the capital ratio 𝛾𝑖. In line with Nier, et al. (2007) or Chan-Lau 
(2010), for the Monte Carlo simulation purposes, the capital ratios are 
assumed the same across all banks and are denoted as 𝛾: 
𝑐𝑖 = 𝛾𝑎𝑖. 
9. The value of each bank’s external liabilities (𝑑𝑖) is calculated so that the 
balance sheet identity holds: 
𝑑𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖. 
When the balance sheets are populated, the system is initialized. The final setting of 
banks’ balance sheets is depicted in Table 1. 
                                         
5 On the aggregate level, it holds that ∑ 𝑧𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑏




4 The Model 
20 
 
4.3 Introducing Negative Shocks 
When the network is prepared, the system stays inactive until we impose an adverse 
shock event, initiating the first simulation lap. There are several types of such events: 
 A share of external assets is deducted from a random bank’s balance sheet. 
We call this a “local shock”. 
 The external assets price drops. In this case, a certain percentage loss on 
these assets is applied to balance sheets of all banks. We call this a “global 
shock”. 
 A sovereign defaults on a portion of its debt. In this case, the shock is 
transmitted to all banks that hold exposure towards this sovereign, i.e. the 
banks “domestic” to the defaulting state. We call this a “sovereign shock”. 
Similarly, at the beginning of each next lap, each bank may receive a total asset-side 
shock of Δ = 𝛿 + 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘, whose individual components are described 
in detail on the following pages. 
4.4 Shock Reaction and Contagion 
If the banks affected by the primary shock do not possess sufficient capital buffers, 
a process of cascade contagion effects may unfold, where in each lap of the 
simulation, the banks that default transmit the shock further onto other banks in the 
system. Let us consider a bank that receives a shock. Whatever the shock type, it is 
reflected in the balance sheet and the bank loses a certain part of its assets. Since the 
sum of assets must equal the sum of liabilities, the bank writes off an equal value of 
liabilities. Firstly, the shocks are absorbed by owners’ equity but if the capital buffers 
are not large enough, the banks default on claims of other creditors. If in lap 𝑡 the 𝑖-
th bank suffers a shock of size ∆𝑖,𝑡= 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑎𝑖,𝑡, its external behaviour depends on the 
shock size relative to its balance sheet structure: 
a) At first, the shock hits the bank’s capital buffer. If 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 > ∆𝑖,𝑡, which means 
that the bank is able to cover the losses by its own equity, then the capital 
buffer absorbs the shock completely and the bank does not send it further to 
other agents in the system. 
b) If 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 < ∆𝑖,𝑡, the residual shock overflows to the interbank liabilities , in 
which case its value up to the value of the interbank liabilities is uniformly 
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divided into losses of all creditor banks. Formally, in case of 𝑚 creditor banks, 
in the next round each creditor bank 𝑗 receives from bank 𝑖 a shock of 







As the propagating bank defaults, in the next lap it is removed from the 
system. Also, in the next lap of the simulation the creditor banks evaluate the 
received shock. The simulation finishes when there is a lap when no bank 
propagates the shock further.  
c) Additionally, it holds that: 
i. If 𝑏𝑖,𝑡 > ∆𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡, the shock is absorbed completely by the bank’s 
capital and interbank liabilities. 
ii. If 𝑏𝑖,𝑡 < ∆𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡,, the shock overflows to external liabilities, meaning 
that the residual loss is covered by the depositors. 
4.5 Liquidity Risk Modelling 
Generally, there are two types of liquidity issues that can affect a stressed financial 
system: market illiquidity and funding illiquidity (Gersl & Komarkova, 2009). The 
former, described firstly by Kyle (1985), represents a situation when transactions in 
which the assets are sold have a negative impact on the asset prices.6 The latter 
refers to inability to meet obligations when they are due. In the recent financial 
crisis, we witnessed both: a sudden gap in short-term bank financing caused funding 
illiquidity on the liability side and the subsequent fire-selling of assets as the only 
means for cash replenishment resulted in further rapid decline in asset prices. 
Therefore, both these types are accounted for in the model.  
4.5.1 Market Liquidity 
Along with Gai & Kapadia (2010), we assume that in case a bank is in default, it has 
to liquidate all of its assets before it is removed from the system. While the sovereign 
debt is assumed to be more liquid and hence is liquidated in full value, the low 
                                         
6 Market liquidity is usually measured by indicators such as market depth, resiliency, tightness, and 
volatility. These indicators may be aggregated into liquidity indices, which then can be used to quickly 
compare markets in time and cross-sectionally. One example of such market liquidity index is the one 
used in Teply, et al. (2012). 
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market depth may limit the capacity to absorb the external and interbank assets. As 
a result, these cannot be sold for the price for which they are kept in the bank’s 
books. Following Cifuentes, et al. (2005), we assume an inverse demand function for 
the external assets, which takes the form of 
 







where 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is the total value of assets (external and interbank) sold by the 𝑖-th bank 
in the system in the current lap, 𝛼 represents the market’s illiquidity (i.e. the speed 
at which the asset price declines) and 𝑃 (𝑥)𝑡 is the new discounted price of external 
assets calculated in each lap.7 The additional loss caused by the asset sales are then 
added to the initial shock on 𝑖-th bank in the current lap and transmitted 
accordingly. Furthermore, assuming marking to market accounting procedure, at the 
end of each lap the external assets of each bank are revalued such that 
𝑒𝑖+1 = 𝑒𝑖,𝑡𝑃 (𝒙)𝑡. 
Hence, the losses stemming from such price adjustment result to a price shock of 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑒𝑖,𝑡(𝑃 (𝒙)𝑡−1 − 𝑃 (𝒙)𝑡) to all banks. 
4.5.2 Funding Liquidity 
As the failing bank liquidates all of its assets, it may withdraw a certain portion of 
its claims on other banks classified as short-term credit. As a result, the debtors of 
the failing bank may receive a funding liquidity shock which decreases their liabilities 
and may require them to sell a portion of their assets to balance out the gap in 
funding (Chan-Lau, 2010). 
If 𝑖-th bank defaults, the portion 𝜆 of interbank liabilities 𝑏𝑗𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖𝑗 of its debtor 𝑗 gets 
erased from the debtor 𝑗’s total liabilities such that  
𝑙𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑙𝑗,𝑡−1 − 𝜆𝑏𝑗𝑖,𝑡. 
Subsequently, the 𝑗-th bank is forced to fire-sale external assets in the value of the 
funding shock. This amount of external assets is added to the total amount offered 
by the banks in the current lap and the 𝑗-th bank receives for them 𝜆𝑃 (𝒙)𝑡𝑏𝑗𝑖,𝑡. The 
value of the loss (1 − 𝑃 (𝒙)𝑡)𝜆𝑏𝑗𝑖,𝑡 is added to the 𝑗-th bank’s credit shock 𝛿. 
                                         
7 Upon the system’s initialization, the price is set to 𝑃 (𝒙)0 = 1. 
4 The Model 
23 
 
4.6 Sovereign Assistance 
As a means of a sovereign to support its domestic banks, we introduce four 
possibilities of sovereign assistance. These include: 
a. Asset relief (AR) – the sovereigns may buy what assets their domestic banks 
need to sell in fire sales. In this case, in each round every bank sells 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 assets 
as described in the basic model definition, but only (1 − 𝑘𝐴𝑅)𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is sold on the 
market since 𝑘𝐴𝑅𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is bought-out by the bank’s domestic government. 
Assuming 1 − 𝑘𝐴𝑅 fixed across all banks and all sovereigns, the Equation 2 is 
replaced by: 
𝑃 (𝒙)𝑡 = exp(




The amount of 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑅 = 𝑘𝐴𝑅𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is then added to the external debt of the 𝑖-
th banks’ domestic sovereign as the domestic government needs to find 
external financing for this rescue measure. 
b. State guarantees execution (SG) – the sovereigns may reimburse the creditors 
of their domestic banks to a certain degree to lower the negative shocks. In 
case this measure is executed, the Equation 1 is replaced as each creditor 𝑗 of 
bank 𝑖 receives a credit shock of: 











𝑘𝑆𝐺 is then added to the external 
debt of the 𝑖-th banks’ domestic sovereign as the domestic government needs 
to find external financing for this rescue measure. 
c. Bailouts and recapitalization (BR) – the sovereigns may pay for losses 
incurred by the banks to replenish their capital buffers and keep them in 
business. In this case when a bank 𝑖 receives a shock of Δ𝑖,𝑡, the sovereign 
covers 𝑘𝐵𝑅Δ𝑖,𝑡, adding this value to the bank’s external assets. Again, the 
amount of 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝐵𝑅 =  𝑘𝐵𝑅Δ𝑖,𝑡 is then added to the external debt of the 𝑖-th 
banks’ domestic sovereign as the domestic government needs to find external 
financing for this rescue measure. 
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d. Funding liquidity provision (FLP) – the sovereigns may provide funding 
liquidity to balance out the funding shocks received by their domestic banks. 
In this case, the sovereign provides funding of 𝑘𝐹𝐿𝑃 𝜆𝑏𝑗𝑖,𝑡 to its domestic bank 
𝑗 in case of a shock coming from a failing bank 𝑖. As with all the previous 
measures, the sovereign needs to finance such measure by raising additional 
debt of 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝐹𝐿𝑃 = 𝑘𝐹𝐿𝑃 𝜆𝑏𝑗𝑖,𝑡. 
4.7 Sovereign Distress 
According to Caruana (2012) and other studies mentioned in the second chapter, 
possible credit risk of sovereigns may feed back into the banking system, mainly via 
direct holdings of government debt by the financial sector. Moreover, Arslanalp & 
Tsuda (2012) confirms that domestic banks hold a significant portion of sovereign 
debt and Pisani-Ferry (2012) or Merler & Pisani-Ferry (2012) based on the 2010 and 
2011 European Banking Association (EBA) stress test data8 point out that the bank 
holdings of sovereign debt show substantial “home bias”. In the 2010 EBA Stress test 
sample, the average home bias in the banks’ holdings of government bonds was near 
60% and was the strongest in case of banks of the most distressed sovereigns of 
PIIGS countries. Hence, holdings of the home sovereign debt are perhaps the most 
important part of the negative feedback loop and as they fit well into the network 
modelling framework, we include them in the model. 
First, as we mentioned previously, sovereign assistance may work very well for short-
term banking system stabilization, but it puts significant pressure on the intervening 
sovereigns. According to Acharya, et al. (2012), state assistance to banks requires 
that the sovereigns immediately issue new debt to finance such measures, which 
results in immediate increase in the sovereigns’ credit risk through the liability side of 
their balance sheets. As mentioned previously, in the model, any type of sovereign 
assistance to the banks results in an increase of the debt of the domestic sovereign. 
The extra budget deficit resulting from the aid measures is the main driver of a 






Second, the sovereign credit risk in the model is represented by probability of default, 
which under a certain assumed recovery rate may be roughly approximated from the 
                                         
8 These stress tests resulted in several EBA recommendations for bank recapitalization. The results of 
the implementation of the latest project, the EBA Capital Exercise may be found in EBA (2012). 
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CDS spreads.9 Credit default swaps are contracts insuring against credit events on 
bonds in case the counterparty defaults. The buyer pays periodically to the seller 
until either the CDS matures or until a credit event occurs, in which case the buyer 
of the insurance is entitled to sell to the seller of the insurance the insured bonds for 
their face value (Hull, 2008) and (Pokorna & Teply, 2011). As our model is of short-
term character and later on, we calibrate it to yearly data, we chose to implement 
the probability that a given sovereign defaults in one year. Although strictly 
speaking, the extraction of this probability from the available 5-year CDS spreads 
would require diligent modelling of both the default state and the no-default state 
cash flows, we can simplify the calculation by assuming a flat CDS spread curve and 
implement the widely used approximation according to J.P. Morgan and Company & 





















𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 is the probability that a given sovereign defaults in one year, 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑘,𝑡 is 
the annual CDS spread expressed as a decimal (e.g. if the spread is 500 basis points, 
𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑘,𝑡 is equal to 0.05), 𝑅𝑅 is the recovery rate and 𝑡 is the number of years for the 
cumulative default probability calculation (in our case, 𝜏 = 1). Moreover, as we fully 
agree with the criticism of using CDS implied probability of default pointing out that 
the additional premiums such as the market price of risk or liquidity premium 
included in the spread may result in biased estimations (e.g. (Amato, 2005) or 
(Remolona, et al., 2007)), we parameterize this relationship by a factor 𝜁 ∈ (0,1) to 
account for the overestimation of the default probabilities. 
Third, the link between sovereign deficits and credit risk is documented by 
econometric studies such as Attinasi, et al. (2009) or Cottarelli & Jaramillo (2012). 
We use the following equation to update the sovereign CDS spreads at the end of 
each simulation lap: 




                                         
9 This approach corresponds to Brigo & Mercurio (2006, p. 701), who state that “CDS’s are now actively 
traded and have become a sort of basic product of the single-name credit derivatives area, ... As a 
consequence, the need is no longer to have a model to be used to value CDS’s, but rather to consider a 
model that can be calibrated to CDS’s.” 
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Putting the previous three points together, at the end of each lap the model collects 
the total amount of each sovereign’s deficit and feeds it into Equation 4 which is then 
itself plugged into Equation 3. The resulting probability of default of a sovereign 𝑘 in 














































At the beginning of each simulation lap, a sovereign 𝑘 may default with probability 
𝑝𝑘,𝑡
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡. In that case, each creditor bank incurs a loss of 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 = 𝒔𝒊(1 − 𝑅𝑅) and 




5 Monte Carlo Simulations 
This chapter presents the results of the Monte Carlo simulations performed with our 
model. First, we describe the simulation process and how the model is controlled. 
Second, we analyse the model’s behaviour under various settings of the network 
structure and global parameters. Third, we introduce sovereign assistance to the 
banks and examine efficiency of the individual support measures given that the states 
have unlimited access to funds. Fourth, we describe the system behaviour when a 
sovereign defaults and show what parameters have the greatest effect on systemic 
stability in this case. Finally, putting it all together with the risk transfer mechanism 
from the banks to sovereigns and a feedback loop back to the banking system, we 
provide a comprehensive model allowing us to test the individual support measures 
under various circumstances. 
5.1 Model Control10 
The Monte Carlo simulations are based on comparative statics experiments where the 
simulations are performed under varying combinations of input parameters. In each 
experiment, the model is run under a set of different parameter settings where some 
of the parameters are fixed and some vary as they are fed to the model in a form of a 
loop on a certain predefined interval. To obtain the results for each parameter 
combination, we run the model in several repetitions, each with a different realization 
of its random variables, and we average the resulting observed variable into a single 
data point. This approach is in line with Nier, et al. (2007). However, since our 
model runs fast enough to achieve the results of much higher iteration count in 
reasonable time, we run each parameter setting 500 or even 1000 times instead of the 
original 100 iterations. This allows us to present readable charts without further 
smoothing and ensures higher robustness of our results Klinger & Teply (2013). 
Because the simulations are not based on real-world data but rather describe the 
general system behaviour, we are more interested in the observable patterns than in 
                                         
10 The model was implemented in Java using NetBeans 7.3. Because of the simulations’ high 
computational intensity, some of the computations were run on the cloud computing platform Amazon 
EC2. Illustration of our application’s GUI and the model output is provided in the Appendix in Figure 
42 and Figure 43. Demonstration of the source code or the modelling process may be performed upon 
request. 
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particular numerical results. Hence, we visualize the simulation outcomes by surface 
or heat map plots, which allow us to observe the effects of two varying parameters at 
once. Still, due to the limited scope of this thesis, many relationships and parameter 
dependencies remain without description. Some were researched in more detail in 
Klinger (2011) and Klinger & Teply (2013) and some are left for future research. 
Figure 8: Scheme of the modelling process 
 
Source: Author 
5.2 Basic Behaviour  
First, we show how the model behaves under various settings of the three key 
parameters: capital ratio (𝛾), connection probability (𝑝𝑏), and market illiquidity (𝛼). 
Similarly to Nier, et al. (2007) and Gai & Kapadia (2010), the initial shock is 
imposed on a random bank and it amounts to the full value of its external assets. As 
this model is a modification of the model in Klinger & Teply (2013) and Klinger 
(2011), the behaviour in the basic infrastructure parameters is very similar. 
Figure 9 depicts how the system behaves when we impose a local shock, i.e. erase all 
external assets of a random bank. In Figure 9A, we see non-linearity in both capital 
ratio and connectivity. The capital ratio is the main parameter determining the 
5 Monte Carlo Simulations 
29 
 
stability of a financial system. When it is lower than 2%, the system is so fragile that 
all the banks connected to the initially defaulting bank (directly or indirectly through 
other banks) default as well. As higher levels of connectivity mean more banks 
connected to the initially defaulting bank, with low capital ratios it holds that the 
more connected the system, the more defaults occur. With higher capital ratios, 
connectivity is becoming an important parameter for systemic safety as it distributes 
the given amount of interbank assets into more exposures. Looking at the individual 
connectivity values, we see that the higher the connectivity, the less capital is needed 
to prevent a significant systemic failure. On the other hand, the failure is more 
sudden when it happens below a certain capital ratio. 
Figure 9: Basic behaviour under a local shock 
Panel A: Capital vs. Connectivity, Alpha = 0 Panel B: Capital vs. Connectivity, Alpha = 1 
Source: Author 
Figure 9B presents the simulations with the market liquidity channel switched on. 
The parameter set is the same except for market illiquidity ratio 𝛼 and marking to 
market ratio 𝜇, which are now both equal to one.11 Already in our previous research, 
we found that when market liquidity distress is included in the model, the number of 
defaults is never lower than when it is not. Instead, the m-shaped dependency on 
connectivity for mid-capital situations is replaced by an area of total collapse of the 
system. Moreover, the systemic fragility becomes more pronounced under high-
capital, low-connectivity parameter settings where the probability of default increases 
severalfold (Klinger & Teply, 2013). 
                                         
11Market illiquidity ratio of 1 means that 10% of external assets sold by the defaulting banks 
impose a 10% price shock at the external assets on the balance sheets of other banks. Marking to 
market ratio of 𝜇 1 means that the price change is completely reflected in all banks’ balance sheets. 
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Looking at both Figure 9A and Figure 9B, we see that the basic pattern is similar 
irrespective of the value of . In both cases, there are “safe zones” with sufficient 
capital level and reasonably high connectivity, where the creditors of initially 
defaulting bank withstand the received shock. These areas present a desirable 
parameter settings for the real-world banking system and both these parameters are 
subject to banking regulation: minimum capital ratios are set by the Basel 
regulations and the control for connectivity is performed by large exposure limits, 
ensuring that interbank assets are diversified to reduce the credit concentration risk 
(Klinger & Teply, 2013). 
Figure 10: Market liquidity effects in case of a local shock 
Panel A: Capital vs. Alpha Panel B: Alpha vs. Marking to market ratio 
Source: Author 
The importance of market liquidity effects is clear from Figure 10A. At zero alpha, 
the resulting shape of the chart is identical to the slice of Figure 9A at connectivity 
equal to 0.2. With increasing illiquidity of the system, more banks fail and when 
alpha reaches the level of 1, the resulting slice is identical to Figure 9B at 
connectivity equal to 0.2. Also, Figure 10A demonstrates that the less capital, the 
more pronounced is the effect of system illiquidity. Conversely, the higher the alpha 
level, the more capital is needed for the system to stay in the “safe zone” and the 
shorter interval of capital ratios it takes for the system to fail. 
Market liquidity effects are also closely tied to the issue of revaluation of assets 
according to the fair value accounting and our model can contribute to the discussion 
about the relationship between marking to market and financial crises. Generally, 
there are two options for asset valuation. First, the assets may be valued at 
amortized cost in which case the users of the financial reports do not have the full 
up-to-date picture about the assets’ true value. On the other hand, such way of 
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reporting ensures certain stability of the system as short-term price changes do not 
affect the companies’ balance sheets. The second way of valuation prices assets 
according to their fair value, which is the price that the markets would pay for their 
immediate sale. In other words, these are marked to market and the unrealized gains 
or losses directly impact the shareholders’ equity. This way of valuation provides the 
users with financial reports more up-to-date information, but also causes that a 
company’s performance may be affected by random short-term price fluctuations or a 
price decrease resulting from market illiquidity. Because of this property, fair value 
accounting has been blamed for contributing significantly to the situation of the 
recent financial turmoil, for example according to Wallison (2009, p. 8), “…if we 
retain fair value accounting in its current form after the current crisis is behind us, 
we will always be living on the edge of another financial abyss”.12  
Returning to the simulation results analysis, Figure 10B depicts the impact of 
marking the asset values to market prices in liquidity distress.13 Clearly, this 
parameter has a very similar negative effect on the systemic stability as has the 
market illiquidity. We see that the more the assets are marked to market, the greater 
and the more sudden is the effect of market illiquidity and conversely, the less liquid 
the market, the more serious is the effect of fair value accounting. If not stated 
otherwise, we set this parameter equal to one to see clearly the impact of market 
liquidity effects. However, modelling these effects provides an important insight on 
the fair value accounting and enables us to better see the effects of funding liquidity 
shocks, which is the next issue for our observation. 
Figure 11 shows simulation results related to funding liquidity effects, which are 
modelled by a funding shock received by the debtors of a creditor bank which finds 
itself in significant distress. In this situation, the debtor bank is forced to fire-sale 
some of its assets to close the gap between assets and liabilities. Hence, modelling 
these effects makes sense only when there are additional losses to the debtor bank 
caused by the fire sales, or in other words when 𝛼 ≠ 0. Consistent with our previous 
simulations, Figure 11 presents the results for 𝛼 = 1. Figure 11A depicts the systemic 
stability given various settings of capital ratio and connectivity and it is very similar 
to Figure 7B, where the funding liquidity effects are switched off. Comparing these 
two plots, it might seem that except for a very slight increase in defaults on 
connectivity levels about 0.1 and the capital ratio in the interval of [7%, 11%], the 
                                         
12 However, there are also reports that say otherwise such as Laux & Leuz (2010) or Shaffer (2010). 
13 The Marking to market ratio may be interpreted as the portion of the external assets which are 
affected by the new distressed asset price. 
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funding liquidity effects are not an important factor for systemic stability. However, 
it is necessary to note that these results are generated with the marking to market 
ratio set to one. When we look at Figure 11B, showing the funding liquidity effects 
with respect to various marking to market ratio levels, we see that when the external 
assets are fully marked to market, market liquidity effects are so pronounced that the 
system is in total collapse and funding liquidity effects do not play a significant role. 
However, for marking to market ratio lower than 0.5, funding liquidity shocks 
introduce significantly more risk into the system. 
Figure 11: Funding liquidity effects in case of a local shock 
Panel A: Capital vs. Connectivity, FS = 1, Alpha = 1 Panel B: Funding shock vs. Marking to market ratio 
Source: Author 
Next, we will examine the system behaviour under different types of bank shocks. 
Figure 12A depicts how the system behaves when instead of hitting one bank 
severely, we impose a global shock of 0.1 (i.e. all banks are shocked by write-downs of 
10% of assets). These simulations represent situations when a global asset drops in 
price and is properly marked to market by all banks. Panel A depicts how the 
systemic stability depends on various settings of capital ratio and connectivity. We 
see that for low capital ratios, the initial shock to each bank is larger than its capital 
buffer and hence all banks default. For capital ratios around 5%, increasing 
connectivity has a slightly negative effect as the defaulting banks cause collapse of 
their first-line creditors, who have been severely weakened by the global shock but 
still maintain operation. On the other hand, for capital ratios in the interval from 7% 
to 10%, increasing connectivity eases the crisis severity as the secondary shocks from 
the initially failing banks are more distributed in the system and do not cause so 
many subsequent defaults.  
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Figure 12: Basic behaviour under a global shock of 0.1 
Panel A: Capital vs. Connectivity, Alpha = 0 Panel B: Capital vs. Interbank asset ratio, Alpha = 0 
Source: Author 
Still, we see that with decreasing capital ratios, it takes a very small interval for the 
system to go from safety to total collapse. This is caused mostly by the character of 
the model, where the heterogeneity among the individual banks is ensured only by 
the random creation of the interbank network. As we see in Figure 12B, increasing 
interbank asset ratio increases the heterogeneity in the system and hence smoothes 
the transition to a system-wide breakdown. This is the main reason why in contrast 
to Nier, et al. (2007), in this study we usually use the value of 0.4 instead of 0.2 for 
the interbank asset ratio parameter (𝜃).14 
Figure 13 demonstrates some further possibilities our model gives us in terms of the 
initial shock setting. Figure 13A depicts the situation where the bank failure results 
from an aggregate shock with particularly adverse consequences. Along with Gai & 
Kapadia (2010), this is modelled by erosion of external assets of all the banks 
combined with a major loss of one particular institution. In reality, this kind of 
situation may be interpreted as a default of one bank combined with asset price 
depression resulting from low confidence in the market. With zero connectivity, there 
is a sudden systemic breakdown at the capital level of 10% as there the global shock 
causes all the banks to default. On an interval of low connectivity where the 
connection probability is between zero and 0.3, there are serious effects even on much 
higher capital levels as the one bank that received the major hit propagates the 
shock further into the system and the first, second and sometimes even the third line 
creditors subsequently default. On the other hand, with higher connectivity levels 
                                         
14 When studying the real-world data, the interbank asset ratio may be lower – e.g. in our dataset which 
we will introduce in the next chapter, the ratio is even below 10%. However, it always depends on how 
many and which subjects are considered as members of the network. 
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and enough capital, the system is again in the “safe zone”. Moreover, with 
connectivity higher than 0.6, even less capital than 10% is needed to prevent the 
systemic breakdown as the initial shocks are better absorbed by the system. Note 
that the area of the total systemic collapse in low-capital, high-connectivity 
situations is somewhat similar to the one in Figure 9B. This is because given proper 
marking to market, the market liquidity channel that is causing the systemic collapse 
in Figure 9B is conceptually similar to the “global” part of the shock that is causing 
it in Figure 13A. Finally, Figure 13B shows how the severity of a local shock affects 
the system. Similarly to lower capital levels, higher shock values also result in more 
systemic risk, which is in line with our expectations. 
Figure 13: Further modifications of the initial shock 
Panel A: Capital vs. Connectivity, Alpha = 1,  
Local shock = 1, Global shock = 0.1 
Panel B: Capital vs. Local shock size, Alpha = 0,  
Local shock = variable, Global shock = 0 
Source: Author 
5.3 Sovereign Assistance 
This section studies the positive impact of state support on systemic stability as well 
as the cost of the support measures. Note that the feedback loops are not introduced 
yet and although it shows the costs of support measures, the following analysis does 
not include the propagation of sovereign weakness back into the banking system. As 
we already mentioned, the model accounts for four types of state support: bailouts 
and recapitalization, execution of state guarantees, asset relief and funding liquidity 
provision. 
5.3.1 Bailouts and Recapitalization 
The first support measure we will examine are bailouts to institutions who are 
receiving negative shocks. As mentioned in Section 4.6 this support is provided in a 
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manner that the domestic sovereign pays for some fraction of the losses before the 
receiving institution writes down its capital. This is conceptually the same as 
providing additional capital to the receiving institution. Figure 14A demonstrates the 
relatively high efficiency of this measure which manages to prevent the systemic 
breakdown. With low bank capital ratio levels, there is always a relatively short 
interval of the amount of state support on which the support measure becomes 
effective and it holds that the lower the capital ratio, the shorter this interval.  
Figure 14: Bailouts and recapitalization effects 
Panel A: Total defaults - Capital vs. Bailouts ratio Panel B: Total cost - Capital vs. Bailouts ratio  
Source: Author 
Figure 14B shows the “costs” of the bailouts represented by the total extra deficit 
resulting from the measure. We see that at low capital levels, the relationship 
between the deficit and the intensity of the bailout measure is positive and linear up 
to a certain bailout ratio behind which it becomes negative, falling back to relatively 
low levels. At a given capital level, the highest bailout costs arise at the level of 
bailout intensity which is high enough to represent a significant cost to the domestic 
sovereign but still too low to prevent the shocks from spilling over the banks’ capital 
barriers onto the next line of creditors. Moreover, in this situation the failing bank 
liquidates its assets, further worsening the situation through the market liquidity 
channel. Behind such level of bailout intensity, the number of defaults suddenly drops 
as the bailout measure becomes effective. This argumentation is further illustrated in 
Figure 44 in the Appendix, depicting the number of simulation laps (i.e. lines of 
creditors receiving the shock) it takes for the system to stabilize, and in the cost-
benefit analysis provided in Figure 18 further in this chapter. 
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5.3.2 State Guarantees 
Instead of providing funds outright to the failing banks to prevent their bankruptcy, 
the domestic states may control the institutions’ default process. This way, even 
though the receiving bank finally goes bankrupt, the shock it imposes on the rest of 
the financial system will be mitigated. Similarly, guarantees issued by the domestic 
sovereign for the receiving bank’s debt may be executed. These situations lead to a 
support measure which is modelled as easing the shock which the receiving 
institution propagates on its first line of creditors. As mentioned in Section 4.6, in 
this case, the domestic sovereign pays for some fraction of the interbank liabilities of 
the receiving institution after it writes down its capital. Figure 15A shows that the 
effect of this measure is similar to the case of outright bailouts. However, looking at 
Figure 15B, we see that the costs of this measure are differently laid out in the 
capital-support space. At low capital ratios and high guarantees intensity, the cost 
peak is almost at the maximum possible level of support, which is caused by the fact 
that under this setting the failure of the initial shock receiver is inevitable whatever 
the guarantee ratio. Moreover, the peak costs reach higher maximum level than in 
the case of outright bailouts. However, in mid-capital, high-support situations, the 
guarantees may reach slightly better cost efficiency as will be further documented in 
Figure 18. 
Figure 15: State guarantees effects 
Panel A: Total defaults - Capital vs. Guarantees ratio Panel B: Total cost - Capital vs. Guarantees ratio 
Source: Author 
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5.3.3 Asset Relief 
In contrast to bailouts and state guarantees, asset relief represents a different concept 
in the model. It is linked to the liquidity channels (both market and funding) as it 
eases the drops in asset prices by ensuring that the banks are able to sell the assets 
without significant fire-sale losses. Figure 16A depicts that at low levels of support 
intensity (asset relief ratio), the asset relief is almost ineffective as it does not suffice 
to prevent the banks’ balance sheet erosion caused by the fire sales. On asset relief 
ratio levels from 0.5 onwards, we see the support measure gaining its effectiveness, 
managing to ease the extent of the systemic crises on capital levels of 5% to 10% and 
effectively preventing the total breakdown at lower capital levels of 2% to 5%. 
Figure 16: Asset relief effects 
Panel A: Total defaults - Capital vs. Asset relief ratio Panel B: Total cost - Capital vs. Asset relief ratio 
Source: Author 
However, Figure 16B shows that this stability improvement comes at significant cost. 
Note that the scale of the plot is five times higher than in case of Figure 14B or 
Figure 15B. It is necessary to mention that in contrast to the previously-mentioned 
two support measures which lead to outright losses of the sovereign’s capital, in case 
of asset relief the domestic sovereign will gain assets of non-zero value out of the 
transaction. However, given the market situation and the aim not to depress the 
asset prices by fire-selling the assets back into the market, in short term, asset relief 
weakens the domestic sovereign significantly more than bailouts or guarantee 
execution as the sovereign needs to fund this action by government deficits. As to the 
shape of the cost function in the capital-support space, we see a similar pattern to 
Figure 15B but the peak cost is much wider, reaching capital ratio levels of 2% at full 
asset relief intensity. This is caused by the fact that this support measure tackles 
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much more global problem as the individual sovereigns need to buy out all the assets 
of the failing banks. 
5.3.4 Funding Liquidity Provision 
Figure 17: Funding liquidity provision effects 
Panel A: Total defaults - Capital vs. Funding liquidity 
provision ratio 
Panel B: Total cost - Capital vs. Funding liquidity 
provision ratio 
Panel C: Total defaults - Capital vs. Funding liquidity 
provision ratio 
Panel D: Total cost - Capital vs. Funding liquidity 
provision ratio 
Source: Author 
The last type of sovereign assistance to the banking system modelled in our 
simulations is provision of funding liquidity to the institutions which received funding 
shocks. As previously mentioned in Section 4.6, this situation happens when a 
creditor of the receiving bank defaults and hence the receiving bank suffers a sudden 
cut in funding resulting from the need to repay the short-term revolving credit to the 
bank in liquidation.  
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Figure 17A demonstrates that under the current parameter setting, the funding 
liquidity provision measure does not have any significant effect on the systemic 
stability.15 As described in comments to Figure 11, this is caused by the market 
liquidity channel overwhelming the funding liquidity: even when the funding liquidity 
is supplied, the market liquidity effects stemming from the failing banks liquidating 
their asset positions cause systemic collapse. On the other hand, despite the 
inefficiency of this measure, its costs are significant and at their peak, they reach 
values over four times higher than in the case of bailouts and deposit guarantees. The 
reason for high costs despite low efficiency is that in these parameter settings, 
although there are many funding shocks, the funding liquidity channel is not the 
main issue determining the systemic resilience.  
For the funding liquidity shock to be a significant cause of the systemic instability, 
the market liquidity channel has to be switched off while the system illiquidity 
remains serious. In the model, this situation is attained by decreasing the marking to 
market ratio as depicted in Figure 17C and Figure 17D, where this parameter was set 
to 0.2 instead of the base value of 1. These figures show that on a certain level of 
capital ratios (roughly 2% to 6%) the funding liquidity provision measure has a 
significant positive effect on systemic stability. 
5.3.5 Cost Efficiency of the Support Measures 
Finally, the individual support measures may be compared in terms of cost-benefit 
efficiency, as shown in Figure 18. To obtain the values of cost efficiency for each 
support intensity value (horizontal axis), we first calculated how many less banks fail 
compared to the situation of no state support. This measure, representing the benefit 
of the individual measures, is then divided by the extra deficit associated with its 
execution. As a result, the individual panels of Figure 18 depict how many banks are 
saved by one currency unit of state support. The first finding of this analysis is that 
direct support such as bailouts and guarantees proves much more efficient than 
measures which aim only on the resulting liquidity issues. Due to such disproportion 
in effectiveness, in Figure 18A and Figure 18B, the support efficiency is plotted on 
ten times higher scale than in case of Figure 18C and Figure 18D. Second, on both 
                                         
15 The funding liquidity provision measure also brings arbitrage opportunities. One example may be the 
ECB‘s Longer-term refinancing operation (LTRO), a measure providing cheap liquidity for the banks 
which they subsequently use as a financing for increasing their profitability through purchasing 
securities bearing higher yields such as short-term government bonds. For example, Victor Massiah, the 
CEO of Unione di Banche Italiane stated that “Given the current costs of funding, it’s more profitable 
for Italian banks to do arbitrage using ECB facilities.” (Benedetti-Valentini, 2013) 
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Figure 18A and Figure 18B, we see a diagonal pattern where the state support is 
most efficient. These areas correspond to the intervals between safety and total 
collapse seen on Figure 14A and Figure 15A. Also, the diagonal pattern for bailouts 
is located more at the left side than the one for state guarantees since bailouts 
mitigate the shocks right at their origin while guarantees only tackle their further 
propagation. Hence, the bailout measure is effective even at lower capital ratio values 
(or lower support intensity values). Third, at the peak, guarantees may be more cost-
efficient than outright bailouts. On the other hand, it is necessary to note that in 
case of bailouts, the domestic sovereign saves its home institution whereas by 
guarantees, it eases shocks the home bank sends to other banks, possibly in other 
states. Therefore, if the model accounted for the effects associated with the real 
economy performance, bailouts may prove to be a more efficient measure. 
Figure 18: Cost-benefit analysis of state support measures 
Panel A: Bailouts and recapitalization Panel B: Guarantees execution   
 
Panel C: Asset relief Panel D: Funding liquidity provision   
 
Source: Author 
Note: The scale of the response variable in panels A and B is ten times larger than in C and D. 
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Further, Figure 18C shows that although the efficiency in case of asset relief is ten 
times lower, the pattern is similar, only with the area of higher efficiency shifted 
further to the right. Again, this is caused by the asset relief being even less direct 
support measure in relation to the initial shock than state guarantees. Finally, it is 
clear from Figure 18D that given this parameter setting, funding liquidity provision is 
not an effective support for systemic stability. 
5.4 Sovereign Defaults 
Figure 19: Basic behaviour under a sovereign shock of 0.4 
Panel A: Capital vs. Sum of sovereign assets,  
Alpha = 0 
Panel B: Capital vs. Sum of sovereign assets,  
Alpha = 1 
Panel C: Capital vs. Connectivity, Alpha = 0 Panel D: Capital vs. Connectivity, Alpha = 1 
Source: Author 
To be able to introduce the feedback loops, we must first describe how the system 
behaves in case of a sovereign default. This section provides results of simulations 
where the initial shock to the banks originates from the sovereign they are exposed 
to. Figure 19 demonstrates that clearly the sovereign shock impact on the systemic 
stability depends on how the financial sector is exposed to the sovereigns. On both 
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Figure 19A and Figure 19B we see that at low capital ratios, even if the exposures 
against sovereigns are small, they may have a devastating effect on the state of the 
financial system. Moreover, with the liquidity channel switched on, the negative effect 
of a domestic state’s default is much more pronounced as we can see in Figure 19B. 
Panels C and D of Figure 19 depict the systemic stability in relation to capital and 
connectivity. Figure 19C shows the situation when the market remains liquid and one 
random sovereign fails. We see that the results in low-capital settings are similar to 
Figure 9A, but from capital ratios of 4% onwards, the systemic stability depends 
more on connectivity than in case of a single bank’s default. In contrast, Figure 19C 
resembles rather the results of a global shock depicted in Figure 12A and the 
system’s connectivity is a key determinant of resilience. These findings are in 
accordance with our anticipation since the sovereign shock hitting the domestic banks 
is conceptually somewhere between the local shock which hits only one bank, and the 
global shock which hits all banks in the system. Moreover, with increasing illiquidity, 
the shock becomes more global since it is affecting more banks’ balance sheets 
through marking to market. 
5.5 Feedback Loops 
Finally, putting together the results of banking crises, state support and the effects of 
state defaults, we close the feedback loop by implementing a mechanism connecting 
the state support and state defaults. First, according to Equation 3 from the model 
definition in Section 4.6, a sovereign may default with probability implied from its 
CDS spread. The impact of CDS-implied defaults of sovereigns is visible in Figure 
20A, which is similar to Figure 9A but shifted upwards as the sovereign risk adds to 
the total systemic instability. As we mentioned in the model definition, the CDS 
spreads contain not only the premium for credit risk of the insured bonds but also 
additional premiums such as the market price of risk or liquidity premium. Hence, we 
adjust the CDS-implied probability by a parameter 𝜁 ∈ (0,1), which is in our 
simulations set to 0.5. Although the decision on its value is rather arbitrary, we see in 
Figure 20B that the results’ dependence on this parameter is linear with moderate 
slope and so the choice of its value does not degrade the robustness of the model. 
Finally, to implement the relationship between state support and sovereign risk, 
according to Equation 4, in each simulation lap the CDS is updated based on the 
volume of support the sovereign provided to domestic banks. In the rest of this 
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section, we study the effects of bailouts, guarantees and asset relief. As in the 
modelled situation the funding liquidity measure did not prove to be effective, we 
omit it from this analysis. 
Figure 20: Adding the implied default probabilities 
Panel A: Capital vs. Connectivity Panel B: Implied default probability adjustment vs. Initial CDS spread 
Source: Author 
5.5.1 Bailouts and Recapitalization 
Figure 21 shows the behaviour of the system when the crisis is tackled by outright 
bailouts of the troubled banks. Figure 21A depicts a collapsing system at capital 
ratio of 4%. Here we see that at low CDS sensitivity to deficits resulting from the 
support measures (parameter 𝛽), bailouts are truly effective for crisis mitigation. 
Especially in the first half of the bailout intensity interval, state action manages to 
decrease the number of defaulted banks significantly. However, with increasing CDS 
sensitivity, the measure becomes less and less effective. Also, at higher CDS intensity 
levels, an interesting pattern appears where higher bailout intensity does not 
necessarily mean less total defaults. This is because at bailout intensity of 0.8, state 
action weakens the sovereigns more than it supports the banks. On even higher 
bailout intensities, however, the measure becomes effective again as it almost 
completely blocks the systemic crisis, restraining it to only zero to ten failed banks, 
depending on the CDS sensitivity. 
Figure 21B depicts the situation at higher capital ratio of 8%. We see that still, state 
support may slightly ease the situation at very low CDS sensitivity levels. However, 
when the market perceives additional deficits as more risky and hence the CDS 
sensitivity is high, state support weakens the sovereigns significantly and is 
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potentially harmful to the system. However, it holds again that with full bailout 
intensity, the bailout measure is effective for crisis mitigation. For more information 
on the dependence of this measure’s effectiveness, refer to the appendix to Figure 
45A and Figure 45B. 
Figure 21: Bailouts and recapitalization with feedback loops 
Panel A: Bailouts ratio vs. CDS sensitivity,  
Capital ratio = 0.4 
Panel B: Bailouts ratio vs. CDS sensitivity,  
Capital ratio = 0.8 
Source: Author 
5.5.2 Guarantees Execution 
Figure 22 demonstrates that the effect of state guarantees execution is somewhat 
similar to the effect of bailouts. Again, Figure 22A presents the system with capital 
ratio level at 4% while in Figure 22B, this parameter is set to 8%. We see that at 
lower capital settings, with low CDS sensitivity the guarantees execution may 
effectively mitigate a systemic breakdown and again, the higher the CDS, the weaker 
the effect. Comparing this support measure with the previous one, there are two 
main differences: First, the guarantees are a little less effective at low CDS sensitivity 
as the slope in case of guarantees is less steep than in case of bailouts. Second, at full 
support intensity, execution of guarantees does not manage to cut the number of 
failed banks as bailouts do. This is caused by the fact that while by bailing a bank 
out, we tackle the shock upon receiving, and hence we may prevent even the initial 
shock receiver from defaulting and liquidating its assets, further deteriorating the 
balance sheets of other banks through marking to market and the market liquidity 
channel. In contrast, state guarantees only solve the problem of further shock 
propagation.  
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Figure 22: Guarantees execution with feedback loops 
Panel A: Guarantees ratio vs. CDS sensitivity, 
Capital ratio = 0.04 
Panel B: Guarantees ratio vs. CDS sensitivity, 
Capital ratio = 0.08 
Source: Author 
Similarly, we may observe the model behaviour at capital ratio level of 8%. Here, we 
clearly see how state assistance turns from beneficial at low CDS sensitivity levels 
through neutral to downright harmful. 
5.5.3 Asset Relief 
Figure 23: Asset relief with feedback loops 
Panel A: Asset relief ratio vs. CDS sensitivity,  
Capital ratio = 0.06 
Panel B: Asset relief ratio vs. CDS sensitivity,  
Capital ratio = 0.08 
Source: Author 
The last type of sovereign assistance we will observe is asset relief. At the capital 
level of 4% which we considered for studying the previous two support measures, 
asset relief proves to have virtually no positive effect and the whole system collapses. 
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Hence, Figure 23A shows the results at capital ratio level of 6%. There we see that at 
low CDS sensitivity, asset relief has a significant positive effect while at high CD 
sensitivities, the support measure can again be rather harmful. These effects are even 
more pronounced in case of capital ratio level of 8%. Here the system is not yet in 
total collapse and asset relief may only worsen the situation. 
5.6 Results Summary 
In line with other studies such as Nier, et al. (2007) or Gai & Kapadia (2010), our 
system proves to be “robust-yet-fragile”, meaning that even though the probability of 
a systemic crisis may be low, when it occurs, it leads to systemic collapse. We showed 
that given the basic parameter set, banks capitalization is the main determinant of 
systemic stability, and together with the system’s connectivity, it determines whether 
a crisis occurs or not. The extent of the crisis is shown to be affected by the market 
illiquidity of the system, while the funding illiquidity worsens the situation only given 
lower marking to market ratios when the funding liquidity channel is not 
overwhelmed by the market liquidity channel. Also, we demonstrated that in case of 
a global shock, systemic stability is more or less binary: either the system is stable or 
it finds itself in an area of a total collapse. This holds especially in cases when the 
portion of interbank assets is low. Table 2 presents the most significant parameters of 
the model we studied in the basic analysis and their impact on systemic stability. 
Table 2: Impact of selected parameters 
Parameter Impact Description 
Capital ratio +++++  Determines the size of the banks’ capital buffers  
 Capital buffer size decides whether a bank withstands 
a credit or market liquidity shock or whether it fails  
Connectivity +++  Determines the density of the banks’ exposures 
 More connected systems absorb smaller shocks more easily but are prone 
to larger extent of a crisis in case of a large shock 
Alpha +++ 
 Lowers the price for which assets can be sold 
 Large amounts of assets sold together with large levels of alpha result in 
asset price collapse and impose losses 
Marking to market 
ratio 
+++ 
 Determines how the changes in asset prices are reflected in the banks’ 
balance sheets 
 Full marking to market together with large alpha levels may result in total 




 Determines the size of a funding gap a debtor bank incurs when a creditor 
bank defaults 
 Proved significant only given low marking to market ratios and is not a 
key determinant of systemic stability 
Source: Author 
Note: The number of plus signs “+” represents the degree of positive impact on the financial 
system stability 
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In case of negative shocks, the banks may be supported by state aid measures such as 
bailouts, guarantees, asset relief or provision of funding liquidity which on one hand 
may weaken the sovereigns but one the other hand may contribute significantly to 
systemic stability. In the simulation setting, bailouts and guarantees proved to be the 
best measures in terms of effectiveness as well as cost efficiency. Asset relief was also 
effective but due to its large costs did not measure up to the former two. Finally, 
funding liquidity provision had very little effect on systemic stability but is rather 
expensive for the sovereigns. Table 3 provides the summary of the individual support 
measures. 
Even though some are effective in the short run, in longer run the support measures 
weaken the sovereigns through extra deficits and increase the probability of a 
sovereign default. Failing sovereigns then return the shock to the banking system 
through negative feedback loops. Generally, for systems in total collapse, state aid 
may significantly ease the extent of the crisis despite sovereigns being weakened by 
the support. However, especially in situations when only some part of the system is 
destabilized and when the sovereigns’ default probabilities are very sensitive to extra 
deficits, the result of state support may be actually worse than in case of no state 
intervention. 
Table 3: Impact of individual support measures 
Measure Effectiveness Cost-efficiency Description 
Bailouts and 
recapitalization +++++ +++++ 
Captures shocks before they hit the receiving 
bank  
Guarantees execution ++++ ++++ Captures shocks the receiving bank propagates onto its creditors 
Asset relief +++ + 
Eases the asset price decline by absorbing 
a portion of external assets that would be 
otherwise fire-sold on the market 
Funding liquidity 
provision + 0 
Captures funding shocks by providing liquid 
assets to the banks whose creditor defaults 
and who would not be able to renew their 
credit lines 
Source: Author 
Note: The number of plus signs “+” represents the degree of positive effect. Zero “0” represents 





6 Empirical Analysis  
In the following chapter, we will calibrate our model to the real-world banking data 
in order to contribute to the current debate on systemic stability and the link 
between banks and sovereigns. As documented by many authors (e.g. Mistrulli, 
(2011)), the data on individual banks’ mutual exposures is not available. Therefore, 
we resort to proxy data inferred from available sources to build the interbank 
network. Instead of individual banks, the agents in our study represent banking 
systems of countries which report their banking positions to BIS and the agents’ 
balance sheets are composed of aggregated figures of all banks reporting in their 
domestic countries. The “interbank” exposure data are complemented with banking 
system data collected from several sources to provide a complete picture of the global 
banking system. 
6.1 Data Definition 
To calibrate the model to the real-world figures, we collected balance sheet data and 
other data from several sources. Table 4 shows the main items which we describe 
further in greater detail. 
Table 4: Banking system balance sheet with data sources 
 TOTAL ASSETS (EBA Database, Central banks) 
 Domestic government debt 
( Arslanalp & Tsuda (2012), IMF IFS Database) 
External liabilities  
(Calculated) 
 Interbank assets 
(BIS International Statistics) 
Interbank liabilities  
(BIS International Statistics) 




+GDP (World Bank), CDS Spreads for the individual countries (Bloomberg) 
Source: Author 
6.1.1 Interbank Assets and Liabilities 
The interbank exposure dataset describes the interlinkages in the global banking 
system. These are collected from the banking section of BIS International Financial 
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Statistics (BCBS, 2013), where the central banks report compiled national aggregates 
calculated from data on individual banks’ in their jurisdiction (BCBS, 2013). To form 
the interbank exposure matrix, we employ data from the consolidated statistics of 
foreign claims on immediate borrower basis. The selection of countries whose banking 
sectors we included in the analysis was based on data availability and includes 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States.16 
The consolidated data provides information on exposures of domestically-owned 
parent banks on the highest consolidation level and hence they include external 
exposures of own foreign offices and exclude all internal inter-office positions in the 
consolidation group (BCBS, 2009). For example, UniCredit SPA headquartered in 
Italy, which is the global ultimate owner of all banks in the UniCredit group, will 
report to Banca d’Italia (Italian national bank and member of the Eurosystem) all 
exposures of its own and of its branches and subsidiaries against banks that are not 
members of the UniCredit group. The exposure of UniCredit Bank AG (German 
subsidiary) against Erste Group Bank AG headquartered in Austria, which is not a 
member of the UniCredit group, is accounted for in the statistics. On the other side, 
an exposure of UniCredit Bank AG (German subsidiary) against UniCredit Bank 
Czech Republic AS is netted out as well as the exposure of UniCredit SPA against 
UniCredit Romania SA. This way, any exposure external to the group is assumed to 
be an exposure of UniCredit SPA and adds to its total risk position. In contrast, the 
locational data provides information on gross positions of banks in selected major 
banking centres against banks located in other countries on residence or nationality 
principle and even though it is better for international banking activity monitoring, it 
does not capture the total risk positions so well.  
On the other hand, we realize several shortcomings of our approach. First, using the 
consolidated statistics further underestimates the real risk positions and complexities 
of the global financial system and thus increases the inaccuracy caused by using 
aggregate data. Second, in many instances, the domestic supervisors of the host 
countries require that the foreign subsidiaries are ring-fenced so that the parent bank 
does not have full access to its subsidiary’s resources (Chan-Lau, 2010). This is 
prevented by both controls on dividends that must not jeopardize a subsidiary’s 
                                         
16 Czech Republic was not included in the analysis as it does not report its international banking 
exposures to BIS. 
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stability and liquidity and on credit exposures where supervisory limits apply for 
intra-group transactions (Cerutti, et al., 2010). Still, implementing the locational 
data would cause greater inconsistencies, as accounting for the intra-group flows 
would lead us to a false conclusion that exposures between two countries where large 
subsidiaries belonging to the same group pose more significant risk than the external 
exposures. The use of the consolidated data is consistent with Chan-Lau (2010).  
The consolidated claims of the reporting countries are collected in several categories: 
(i) cross border claims, (ii) local claims of foreign affiliates in foreign currency, and 
(iii) local claims of foreign affiliates in local currency. While categories (i) and (ii) 
together are called International claims in the BIS terminology, categories (i), (ii) and 
(iii) together are called foreign claims. As all the mentioned categories are relevant 
for capturing the risk exposures of individual banking sectors, the latter group is 
employed in the analysis. 
The consolidated statistics of foreign claims are then further divided into data on 
immediate borrower basis vs. ultimate borrower basis. While the former one considers 
the counterparty as the one where the original risk lies, the latter recognizes the one 
who is ultimately liable for the funds borrowed. For example, if a German bank lends 
to a French one and secures the transaction by CDS or a guarantee issued by an 
Austrian bank, the immediate borrower statistics would record the German banking 
system as the creditor and the French one as the counterparty. In contrast, the 
Ultimate borrower basis statistics would record the Austrian banking system as the 
counterparty since that is where the risk of the transaction was transferred. For this 
reason, using the Ultimate borrower statistics may be superior for modelling 
situations where the risk materializes by a counterparty default. However, the 
exposure data is not available on a bank-to-bank basis as the aggregate exposures of 
the reporting countries include also bank-to-public-sector and bank-to-non-bank-
private-sector claims. Hence, trying to infer the risk transfer exposures and trying to 
implement them in the analysis would add another layer of approximation and along 
with Chan-Lau (2010), we consider it inappropriate and use the Immediate borrower 
basis data. 
Nevertheless, as it is not possible to obtain directly the pure bank-to-bank exposures 
between the individual countries’ banking sectors, some level of approximation is 
inevitable. To estimate the bank-to-bank exposures from the reporting banking 
sectors’ pool of total claims, we employ another dataset of the BIS statistics, which is 
the total claims on each country’s banking sector by all the reporting sectors, 
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grouped by the type of the debtor institution (i.e. whether it is a bank, public sector 
or a non-bank private sector. By taking a fraction of bank debt on the total debt, we 
obtain proxy variables for individual counterparties. Finally, we multiply the whole 
column of the exposure matrix representing the given counterparty’s debts by this 
variable to calculate the estimated interbank network. Figure 24 visualizes this 
calculation. 
Figure 24: Estimation of the bank-to-bank exposures 
 
Source: Author 
When the network is created, it can be plotted as in Figure 25.17 For better 
readability, we provide two different views for the same dataset. In Panel A, we show 
the edges of the network (interbank exposures) coloured according to the source of 
funds (i.e. the creditor, the bearer of the risk). For example, there is a strong 
exposure of Switzerland against the United States and it is coloured blue according 
to the colour of Switzerland. On the other hand, Panel B provides the situation from 
the counterparty viewpoint and hence the exposures of all parties to the United 
Kingdom are coloured in green, as well as the UK itself. These visualizations provide 
an efficient overview of the situation and a quick grasp of the basic relationships. For 
example, in the centre of the network, we see the “core” sectors, (highly interlinked 
nodes such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, Germany or 
Switzerland) and around them there are more “peripheral” banking systems. Also, as 
                                         
17 As the model will be calibrated for 2011, Figure 25 shows the interbank network as of Q4 2011. 
Nevertheless, historical network visualizations as well as the most up-to-date one for Q3 2012 are 
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the visualization algorithm18 takes into account the relationships in the network and 
places the nodes accordingly, we can see patterns that are in line with our 
anticipation based on the individual countries’ location or cultural relationships. Note 
for example the pairs of countries being placed together, such as Sweden and 
Denmark or Turkey and Greece. Also, the clusters of related countries are placed 
logically together, such as Italy, Spain and Portugal forming the Southern Europe 
cluster with proximity to Brazil. Also note that after its default, Greece is placed on 
the edge of the network with very low connection to other banking systems.  
Figure 26 depicts the same data aggregated for each country’s banking system. The 
bars in positive values represent the aggregated value of its exposures against other 
countries in the interbank network, the bars in negative values represent the 
aggregated value of claims the other network members hold against it. The black 
dots stand for net positions of the given countries. We see that the most negative 
banking positions are held by the United Kingdom, France and Canada. These 
positions have to be offset by claims external to the network, such as loans to private 
sector or purchases of derivatives and other securities. The most positive positions 
are then held by the United States, Germany and, perhaps surprisingly, Spain. 
Again, these positions are offset externally by taking deposits or selling securities. 
However, most of the countries’ banking systems have their positions relatively 
balanced, even in case of Japan, which is involved quite heavily in the interbank 
network. 
The interbank debt structure hints that in case of the UK’s default, the system 
would be hit most severely, whereas the United States is likely to get the largest 
shock given a default of other countries. However, these are shocks in absolute value 
and do not imply any information about vulnerability of the individual countries. To 
be able to model the systemic risk on the interbank network, we need to introduce 
other variables. 
 
                                         
18 The visualizations were prepared in Gephi software. For the calculation of the node layout, we used 
the Force Atlas algorithm, which places the nodes in the graph according to the values of edges in the 
network matrix. While the scientific article on Force Atlas algorithm is still awaiting acceptance and 
publication, interested reader may find more information on graph clustering and layouting in Noack 
(2007). 
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Figure 25: Interbank network of the selected countries as of Q4 2011 
 
 
Source: Author based on data from BIS International Financial Statistics 
Note: Panel A shows the edges coloured by the creditor node (e.g. exposure of Switzerland 
against the United States is coloured in blue, which is the colour of Switzerland on the chart) 
whereas in Panel B, they are coloured according to the debtor node (e.g. exposure of Germany 
against the United Kingdom is coloured in green as well as the UK node) 
Panel A:  
Panel B:  
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Figure 26: Positions of selected banking systems as of Q4 2011 
 
Source: Author based on data from BIS International Financial Statistics 
It is also necessary to mention that this dataset provides information only on 
interbank lending and not on external financing of banks by sovereigns or central 
banks, which may be quite significant, especially in the Eurosystem. On the same 
note, these data do not provide information on balances in the TARGET2 system, 
which has been lately discussed in Cecchetti, et al. (2012) and which now form a 
significant part in the mutual exposures of the Eurosystem banks. The above-
mentioned facts mean that Figure 26 does not provide the entirely complete picture 
of the global banking system, and in our model, bank financing of this type is 
captured in the rest of the bank’s balance sheet, in particular in the external assets. 
However, we will see that the large disproportion between the relatively small 
interbank assets and the rest of the total assets value captured in external assets is 
one of the main shortcomings of interbank network models such as Chan-Lau (2010). 
6.1.2 Total Assets 
The banking systems’ total assets represent another important input into the model 
as it is used for calculation of capital, external assets and external liabilities of the 
individual banking sectors. Despite it being an important variable for comparison of 
banking systems in time as well as in cross-section, the data on sums of total assets is 
not readily available and vary significantly across data sources.19 To keep our dataset 
                                         
19 E.g. taking the same data from BankScope, the differences in some cases were significant. We explain 
this by the fact that BankScope is not the best source for total sums of variables for individual banking 
sectors Bhattacharya (2003), and resort to the aggregated data from EBF and the central banks.  
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as consistent as possible, the main source we used is the Banking Sector Statistics 
database of the European Banking Federation (EBF, 2013), which provides data on 
all European countries in the sample. The data on countries not represented in this 
primary source were taken from the databases of the individual central banks. The 
data is summarized in Table 5 along with visualizations of their time-development 
and cross-sectional context. There, we can see a clear rise of the asset volumes 
consistent with the initial risk build-up as mentioned in Section 2.1.1, where the first 
phase of the crisis was described. Also, the data show the effect of the crisis on the 
total amount of banking assets, mainly in the financial centres such as Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom and the United States where the deleveraging is most visible. 
Looking at the 2011 figures and comparing them across the individual banking 
sectors, the countries with the largest banking sectors are France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. On the other hand, Greece and Turkey have 
the smallest banking sectors, which are each more than twenty times smaller than the 
one of the United States. 
Table 5: Total assets of individual banking systems in USD billion 
 
Source: Author according to the Banking Sector Statistics Database from the European Banking 
Federation and according to individual central banks. 
6.1.3 Equity 
As seen in the Monte Carlo simulations section, the size of the capital buffers is the 
main determinant of the stability of the individual banks as well as the whole system. 
In contrast to the total assets data, in case of banking sector capitalization, we are 
2005-2011 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2011
Australia 1 097 1 404 1 957 1 890 2 387 2 801 2 954
Austria 849 1 040 1 301 1 474 1 483 1 312 1 303
Belgium 1 248 1 484 1 914 1 774 1 667 1 521 1 546
Brazil 738 973 1 428 1 257 1 876 2 308 2 485
Canada 1 764 2 051 2 622 2 608 2 739 3 082 3 586
Denmark 880 1 081 1 428 1 516 1 591 1 515 1 477
France 6 457 8 147 10 467 10 718 11 026 10 492 10 825
Germany 8 094 9 444 11 161 10 971 10 708 11 128 10 828
Greece 338 424 576 646 709 690 615
Ireland 1 363 1 920 2 445 2 407 2 353 2 046 1 693
Italy 3 067 3 789 5 009 5 135 5 395 5 078 5 244
Japan 7 480 7 494 7 686 8 133 8 003 8 148 8 511
Netherlands 2 003 2 433 3 187 3 102 3 192 3 028 3 133
Portugal 426 525 647 670 749 749 740
Spain 2 605 3 335 4 418 4 739 4 963 4 651 4 700
Sweden 778 1 032 1 257 1 261 1 348 1 431 1 471
Switzerland 2 170 2 624 3 072 2 873 2 596 2 908 3 002
Turkey 284 346 484 460 537 657 643
United Kingdom 9 976 12 911 14 656 12 131 12 901 12 295 12 524
United States 10 879 11 862 13 034 13 841 13 087 13 319 13 892
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interested in the proportion of capital to total assets rather than the total sum and 
hence, the capital ratios were taken from the BankScope database. BankScope offers 
several types of capital ratios used for regulatory purposes and should provide good 
information on the banks’ capitalization, e.g. Tier 1 or Total regulatory capital. 
However, these series are very incomplete and sometimes reaching values that seem 
unreliable and too high compared to the interbank network data. Hence, we adopted 
a more conservative approach and chose common equity (common shares plus 
retained earnings) to total assets as the proxy for banks’ capitalization. This variable 
is easily available for all banks in the database and ultimately, our approach is 
consistent with the latest opinion of the Bank for International Settlements that: “It 
is critical that banks’ risk exposures are backed by a high quality capital base. The 
crisis demonstrated that credit losses and writedowns come out of retained earnings, 
which is part of banks’ tangible common equity base” (BCBS, 2010, p. 2).  
Table 6: Equity to asset ratios of individual banking systems 
 
Source: Author’s calculations according to the BankScope database 
Table 6 presents the obtained figures, which were calculated as weighted averages of 
equity-to-assets ratios where the weights are the individual banks’ total assets in the 
given year.20 The most-capitalized banking sector is the one of Canada, which 
corresponds to the fact that no Canadian bank needed recapitalization during the 
recent crisis (Ratnovski & Huang, 2009). On the other hand, the least capitalized is 
                                         
20 For the analysis, we considered the banks with the following specialisations: commercial banks, 
savings banks, cooperative banks, real estate & mortgage banks, bank holdings & holding companies 
2005-2011 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2011
Australia 5.49% 5.34% 5.85% 5.79% 6.21% 6.27% 5.40%
Austria 5.21% 6.20% 6.44% 5.64% 6.38% 7.05% 6.73%
Belgium 3.85% 4.12% 4.56% 3.04% 4.10% 4.40% 3.97%
Brazil 9.01% 9.41% 9.44% 7.73% 7.79% 7.81% 7.83%
Canada 8.04% 9.96% 9.71% 10.60% 13.00% 15.02% 14.79%
Denmark 4.27% 4.49% 4.22% 3.85% 4.09% 4.22% 4.34%
France 4.02% 4.14% 3.83% 3.16% 4.01% 4.19% 4.05%
Germany 3.87% 3.93% 4.03% 3.48% 3.66% 4.09% 4.92%
Greece 5.98% 6.86% 8.25% 6.34% 7.49% 6.83% 0.18%
Ireland 2.95% 3.19% 3.41% 2.28% 2.14% 1.46% 5.36%
Italy 7.63% 7.80% 7.87% 7.34% 8.15% 8.17% 7.16%
Japan 3.25% 4.29% 4.72% 4.08% 3.04% 4.18% 4.51%
Netherlands 3.56% 3.55% 3.55% 2.77% 4.00% 4.12% 4.14%
Portugal 4.72% 5.46% 4.95% 4.73% 5.50% 5.10% 4.71%
Spain 5.75% 5.98% 6.15% 5.56% 6.23% 6.33% 6.31%
Sweden 4.17% 4.33% 4.27% 3.91% 4.46% 4.54% 4.23%
Switzerland 3.65% 4.05% 4.01% 3.48% 4.55% 4.65% 4.49%
Turkey 12.65% 11.72% 12.62% 10.92% 12.17% 12.57% 11.28%
United Kingdom 4.06% 4.04% 3.88% 2.64% 4.29% 4.68% 4.75%
United States 7.92% 7.95% 7.52% 6.80% 8.55% 8.60% 8.99%
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the Greek banking sector which was severely hit in 2011. On a related note, Ireland is 
at its historical minimum under 1.5% in 2010. Finally, looking at the figures from the 
time perspective, we see a clear drop in most capital ratios in 2008 with fast recovery 
in most countries’ banking systems as the banks were extensively recapitalized. 
6.1.4 Sovereign Debt to Banks 
To introduce the link between banks and sovereigns into the banks’ balance sheets, 
we collected two sovereign debt datasets which were then added together. These are 
exposures to the domestic banking system, collected mainly from Arslanalp & Tsuda 
(2012) and supplemented by data from the IMF IFS database (IMF, 2012), and 
exposures to other banking systems, collected from the BIS International Financial 
Statistics (BCBS, 2013).  
While the first dataset collection is straightforward, in case of the second one we have 
to employ a similar calculation as in the case of interbank assets. Again, the data is 
taken from the consolidated statistics of foreign claims on immediate borrower basis. 
To estimate the banks’ exposures to sovereigns from the reporting banking sectors’ 
pool of total claims, we multiply the whole column of the exposure matrix 
representing the given state’s debts by the fraction of its sovereign debt on the total 
debt.21 The same approach was used in Arslanalp & Tsuda (2012) for the calculation 
of foreign banking sector holdings of sovereign debt. However, we must note that this 
data provide information only on the individual sovereigns’ debt towards the banking 
sectors in our sample. Thus it does not describe the countries’ total debt positions. 
Figure 27: Selected banking systems’ exposures to sovereign debt as of Q4 2011 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Arslanalp & Tsuda (2012), IMF International 
Financial Statistics and BIS International Financial Statistics 
                                         
21 The calculation may be visualized by Figure 24, only the question marks (?%) would now represent 
the value of the banks’ exposures to counterparty public sectors instead of counterparty banking sectors. 
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Figure 27 visualizes the figures for each sovereign’s debt to the foreign as well as to 
the domestic banks. We see that for all banking systems except of the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, there is a relatively strong bias towards the domestic 
banks (note the logarithmic scale of the chart). This phenomenon, already 
documented in Pisani-Ferry (2012), Merler & Pisani-Ferry (2012) or Acharya, et al. 
(2012), results in a strong link between sovereigns and their domestic banks through 
balance sheet exposures and is one of the reasons why sovereign risk translates 
through feedback loops into the domestic banks’ risk. With debt to banks amounting 
to over $4 trillion, Japan is the most indebted sovereign in our sample and also 
reports the strongest home bias as the overwhelming majority of Japan’s large public 
sector debt to banks is held by the domestic institutions.22  
Figure 28: Detailed banking systems’ exposures to sovereign debt as of Q4 2011 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Arslanalp & Tsuda (2012), IMF International 
Financial Statistics and BIS International Financial Statistics 
Note: The edges are coloured by the creditor node (e.g. exposure of US sovereign against the 
Canadian banking system is coloured in red). The edges’ thickness represents the exposure size on 
a natural log scale and all exposures amounting to less than USD 5 billion were filtered out for 
better readability. 
                                         
22 According to (IMF, 2013b), Czech Republic is second after Japan in bank holdings of sovereign debt. 
These amount to over 17% of total banking assets. 
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For better insight into the interlinkages between banks and sovereigns, one has to 
study also the detailed exposures, including the international ones. Figure 28 presents 
these data as a plot of the bipartite network of sovereigns and banking systems in our 
sample. Similar to Figure 25, the edges represent the sovereign debt towards the 
individual banking system. Here we see again the home bias phenomenon as the 
largest links are always to the domestic banking system and also for the individual 
countries, interesting patterns emerge. Again, the debt to foreign banks is determined 
largely by geographical or cultural proximity of the individual countries. Notice for 
example that the largest foreign borrowing of Austria is from German and Italian 
banking systems, Belgium is connected mostly to France and the Netherlands, 
Denmark is connected to Sweden and vice versa. As to the cultural proximity, Brazil 
borrows mostly from Spanish banks and Australia from the UK banking system (and 
from Japan, which is again close geographically). Also Canada is linked to the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Finally, there are several “international borrowers”, 
such as the United States, Germany, France and to some extent also Japan. 
6.1.5 GDP and CDS Spreads 
Figure 29: GDP of the selected countries in constant 2000 US dollar 
 
Source: Author according to the World Bank database 
Besides balance sheet data for the individual countries’ banking systems, the model 
requires two more datasets for complete calibration: GDP and CDS spreads of the 
individual sovereigns. The gross domestic product data was collected from the World 
Bank database (World Bank, 2013). From the available series, the one in constant US 
dollars of the year 2000 was selected in order to prevent exchange rate fluctuations 
and inflation to bias the data in case of using the model on a time series. Figure 29 
captures the absolute value of GDP of the analysed countries in 2011and shows large 
disparities among the economies. The sample mean value of this indicator is $1.45 
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trillion, approximately the product of France. The US output is far the largest with 
the value exceeding $11.7 trillion. On the other side of the scale, Portuguese GDP 
accounts for only 1/100 of the US one and is the lowest from the sample. Also, 
Portugal experienced the second largest proportional drop compared to the previous 
year. As expected, the leading position in this matter belongs to Greece whose 
annual growth rate stood at -7.1%. The fastest growing country was Brazil which was 
expected due to its status of emerging economy. However, Sweden and Germany also 
experienced a healthy annual growth rate exceeding 3%.  
Data on 5-year credit default swap spreads were obtained from the Bloomberg 
database. Figure 30 captures the average value of CDS spreads for selected countries 
in 2011. The median value reaches 307 basis points which is approximately the CDS 
spread of Austria. Apparently, the PIIGS countries are markedly more prone to 
default as their CDS spreads significantly exceed the common levels, in case of 
Greece, the value is 11 times higher than the median, in case of Portugal, 
approximately five times higher. According to the market perception, the United 
States are the least likely to experience a default. 
Figure 30: CDS Spreads of the selected countries 
 
Source: Author according to Bloomberg 
6.2 Model Calibration 
Put all together, the collected data provide a complex picture of the modelled global 
banking system according to Table 4. The internal assets of individual subsystems 
are calculated as the sum of their exposures to other subsystems; the sovereign assets 
as the sum of their exposures to sovereigns and the external assets as the total assets 
minus the internal and the sovereign assets. Similarly, capital is calculated as the 
collected capital ratios times the total assets of the individual subsystems; their 
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internal liabilities are sums of their debt towards other subsystems, and the external 
liabilities are total assets minus capital and the internal liabilities. While the 
calibrated model will be tested for 4Q 2011 data, we plan to provide time series of 
the model’s estimation in the future research. 
Figure 31: Balance sheets of the calibrated model as of Q4 2011 
Panel A: Banks’ assets Panel B: Banks’ liabilities 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Figure 31 provides the final overview of the calibrated balance sheets which are 
loaded into the model.23 As we can see on Figure 31A, the external assets constitute 
the majority of the bank’s balance sheets, in fact around 80%, while the sovereign 
assets account for 12% and the interbank assets only for 8%. Similarly on the liability 
side depicted in Figure 31B, external liabilities form an overwhelming 86% of the 
total liabilities while the banks’ equity accounts for 6% and the interbank liabilities 
for 8%. The fact that the interbank network forms only a small portion of the total 
banking assets value is the main shortcoming of the pure credit contagion approach. 
It points at the fact that without oversimplified extrapolation of the interbank 
network to the rest of the banking system, it is difficult to draw any conclusions from 
works such as Chan-Lau (2010) that study only the effects of the direct contagion 
and funding shocks and relies solely on the BIS interbank network data. In fact, our 
finding stresses the significant gap in the knowledge of banking exposures and 
                                         
23 In case of the empirical analysis, instead of generating the system according to a number of 
parameters, the model constructs it according to the real-world data. The datasets are loaded into the 
application in form of four xml files: 1) interbank network definition, 2) sovereign-bank network 
definition, 3) bank balance sheet data, and 4) sovereign data. 
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demands further data collection which would enable us to break the external assets 
into more detail. More information on this issue will be provided in the next chapter 
on further research opportunities.  
As opposed to Chan-Lau (2010), we incorporate the full size of the banking system 
and incorporate the indirect channel of contagion through market liquidity as 
described by Brunnermeier, et al. (2009) and Cifuentes, et al. (2005). Given the 
amount of external assets, we expect that the liquidity channel will play a significant 
role for systemic stability. This channel is recognized also by authors focusing on the 
direct credit contagion, as documented by Upper (2011). 
6.3 Results 
In this section, we present the simulation results of the calibrated model. We will 
observe the systemic importance of the individual banking subsystems or sovereigns 
as the initial shock propagators and we will study how and at what cost state 
support may ease a systemic crisis. Finally, we implement the feedback loops as in 
the previous chapter. 
6.3.1 Basic Shocks 
First, we show how the model behaves under various settings of the key parameters 
and given various initial shock propagators. Similarly as in Chapter 5 on Monte 
Carlo simulations, we begin by imposing basic shocks to the individual banking 
subsystems. When we hit each of them one by one by erasing all their external assets 
and leave the liquidity channel switched off, the system seems to be relatively stable 
as depicted in Figure 32A. Almost in all cases the only bank which defaults is the 
originally shocked bank, only in case of France, Germany, the Netherlands, Turkey 
and the United Kingdom, the shock transmitted on Greece induces its default. 
Moreover, in case we impose the original shock on Denmark, the shock imposed on 
Sweden is larger than its capital buffer and hence it defaults as well. The first 
outcome is given by significantly low capitalization of Greece, making it very 
vulnerable to default, and the second outcome is given by a strong link between 
Denmark and Sweden, which we described already in Section 6.1.1 on the description 
of the interbank network. As mentioned in Section 6.2 on model calibration, the 
relative stability of the system is given by relatively small share of the interbank 
assets on the total assets in the system. As the capital ratios are calculated from 
6 Empirical Analysis 
63 
 
total assets, most of the shocks that are purely of the direct credit contagion type are 
not large enough to break through the capital barriers. The system does not break 
down even when the liquidity channel is switched on by setting the value of Alpha to 
one as then the only difference is that in case of initially shocking Denmark, two 
banking subsystems now fail: those of Sweden and Greece. Figure 32B depicts this 
scenario. 
Figure 32: Model results under various scenarios 
Panel A: Base scenario with alpha = 0, local shock = 1 Panel C: Base scenario with alpha = 1, local shock = 0.5 
Panel B: Base scenario with alpha = 1, local shock = 1
Source: Author’s calculations 
However, the situation changes when the system is shocked by a local shock equal to 
0.5, which means that only half of the external assets of the initial shock receiver is 
erased. In this case, demonstrated in Figure 32C, there is much more assets to sell 
during the shock receiver liquidation, which in case of a non-zero alpha puts a 
significant pressure on the external asset prices. As a result, Greece fails in all cases 
and moreover, when the initially shocked banking subsystems are France, Germany, 
Italy, the United Kingdom or the United States, the global system reaches a state of 
a total collapse. We saw in the Section 6.1.2 on total assets, that these countries’ 
banks have one of the largest asset volumes. Interestingly, despite having a large 
asset volume, Japanese banks do not induce a total systemic break-down as they hold 
less external assets on their balance sheets and instead, they are exposed against the 
home sovereign. 
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The pattern seen in Figure 32C is similar when we run the simulations with 20 
different values of local shock [0.05, 0.1, 0.15, …  0.095, 1] average them into datapoints 
and plot them against various levels of alpha. Usually, under each parameter setting, 
initially hitting one country’s banking sector results either in defaults of a few other 
banking sectors, or a total systemic collapse. Again, this is given by the fact that in 
our model the liquidity effects are the most important channel of contagion and the 
banks hold a large portion of external assets. To get a comprehensive map of 
systemic risk, we need to look at several various local shocks and alpha values. 
Figure 33 provides such map for each initial propagator by aggregating data for 
various local shocks and averaging them to obtain relatively continuous plots of 
systemic risk’s dependence on the system illiquidity (represented by the parameter 
alpha). As expected and in line with the Monte Carlo simulations, after breaking a 
certain threshold, lower liquidity usually leads to more defaults. However, in our 
analysis, there are certain initially shocked banking systems for which the threshold 
is not reached on the assumed interval of alpha and hence we categorize them as of 
low systemic importance. We see that even for high levels of alpha for Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Ireland, Portugal and Turkey, the number of defaults in the system 
is limited to two, which usually means the originator banking system plus Greece. 
Moreover, as Greek banking sector is not systemically important, the only banks that 
default in case the shock begins in this country are the Greek ones.  
On the other hand, mostly large banking sectors such as Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom or the United States proved to be systemically important and 
especially France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States are clearly 
too big to fail even at relatively conservative levels of alpha. The banking sector with 
the soonest outbreak of systemic crisis under increasing alpha is the United Kingdom 
and interestingly, at high alpha levels French banks prove the highest systemic 
importance. As to the lower-tier systemic banking sectors, Italian, Japanese and 
Spanish banks are still relatively important with crisis outbreaks starting at alpha 
levels lower than one and with crisis extent reaching over the half of the whole 
system at the maximum alpha level. Finally, Australia, Canada, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland are of mild systemic importance. 
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Figure 33: Banking subsystems’ average systemic importance 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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A different view at the same issue is provided in Figure 34 where we observe systemic 
weakness of individual banking systems instead of systemic importance. The data for 
this analysis was obtained from averaging simulations across 20 different values of 
local shock [0.05, 0.1, 0.15, …  0.095, 1], across 20 different levels of alpha from the 
same interval and across all the 20 initial propagator banking systems. The plot 
depicts the cumulative probability of default of each country’s banks in the first to 
the seventh lap of the simulation. As we mentioned earlier, if our model reaches a 
state of a systemic collapse, in the last simulation lap usually all banks ultimately 
default. However, if the system experienced an earlier recovery, we see that the 
banking systems of some countries are not very likely to default. For example, 
Canada and Turkey have a zero probability of default in the first lap of shock 
propagation because of their good capitalization while Sweden seems to be rather 
vulnerable, mostly to its relatively low capitalization and large exposure to Denmark 
as described earlier in this chapter. Greek banks had to be omitted from the 
visualization because with cumulative probabilities only slightly below 80% right 
from the first lap of propagation, they were deforming the scale of the plot.  
Finally, combining the observations from Figure 33 and Figure 34, we may even say 
which countries a potential regulation or aid policy should mostly focus on. For 
example, not only would the French banks have the most impact on the system in 
case of their default, but in contrast to other banking systems (and mainly the 
United States), they are more likely to default early in case of a crisis. 
Figure 34: Banking subsystems’ average propensity to default 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Note: Greek banks were omitted because their cumulative default probabilities only slightly below 
80% right from the first lap of propagation were deforming the scale of the plot. 
6.3.2 Sovereign Assistance 
In this section, we will explore the effects of sovereign assistance on the calibrated 
global banking system. As in Chapter 5 on Monte Carlo simulations, we will describe 
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the impact and costs of the three support measures: Bailouts and recapitalization, 
guarantees execution and asset relief. In line with the Monte Carlo simulations, when 
testing the fourth measure (funding liquidity provision) on the calibrated data, 
although it had some very small positive effect, it proved almost insignificant to 
systemic stability and hence we leave it out from our analysis.  
Figure 35: Bailouts and recapitalization effects 
Panel A: Total defaults - Alpha vs. Bailouts ratio Panel B: Total cost – Alpha vs. Bailouts ratio  
Source: Author 
Again, first we look at bailouts as the most direct support measure. Figure 35A 
depicts the number of bankrupt banking subsystems given various levels of alpha24 
and various support intensities. The positive effects of this measure are clearly visible 
and with maximum bailout support, no bank defaults as the shock is mitigated right 
at its origin. We see that at low values of alpha, the effect of state aid is very low and 
almost linear. However, with growing illiquidity, the state support is increasingly 
important and at maximum alpha, we see a “step-like” dependence where a very 
small increase in state support may prevent default of three banking subsystems. As 
to the sovereign deficits caused by this measure, Figure 35B demonstrates that at 
very low levels of alpha, the costs increase almost linearly with the support intensity. 
However, similarly as we saw in the Monte Carlo simulations, for low capitalized 
systems, under high levels of alpha, the costs rise only until some level of support 
intensity beyond which they fall sharply. This is caused by the support measure 
                                         
24 As the banking network is now based on real data and thus the connectivity parameter no longer 
exists, and also because now we are more interested by liquidity effects, the second parameter we 
observe in the figures is the system’s illiquidity. 
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effectively blocking the contagion through market liquidity channel and corresponds 
to the sharp drop of defaults in Figure 35A. 
Figure 36: Guarantees execution effects 
Panel A: Total defaults - Alpha vs. Bailouts ratio Panel B: Total cost - Alpha vs. Bailouts ratio  
Source: Author 
Second, we observe the effects of sovereign guarantees and their execution. Figure 
36A demonstrates that this support measure mitigates the crisis only mildly and 
especially at high levels of alpha it is much less efficient than bailouts. This is given 
by the fact that the shock is captured by the guarantees only after it already 
negatively affects the asset prices through the liquidity channel. As to the deficits 
needed to finance this kind of support, Figure 36B demonstrates that they are 
slightly lower than in the case of outright bailouts and they rise monotonously with 
the support intensity at all levels of alpha. 
Figure 37: Asset relief effects 
Panel A: Total defaults - Alpha vs. Bailouts ratio Panel B: Total cost - Alpha vs. Bailouts ratio  
Source: Author 
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Figure 38: Cost-benefit analysis of state support measures on the calibrated model 
Panel A: Bailouts and recapitalization Panel B: Guarantees execution  
Panel C: Asset relief  
                         
Source: Author 
Thirdly, looking at the effects of asset relief programmes as depicted in Figure 37A, 
we see that they do not cause such sharp drops in numbers of failed banks as those of 
outright bailouts, but still are very significant. Because asset relief is tied to the 
liquidity channel, we see that the shape of the dependence of systemic stability on 
the support intensity is similar to the shape of its dependence on (1 − 𝛼). Also, in 
contrast to outright bailouts which may be targeted at the initial propagator, in case 
of asset relief, the banks which are hit by the primary shock always fail. Looking at 
the costs of this measure, Figure 37B shows that at the peak they are slightly higher 
than those of the bailouts. Also, except for the area of support intensity of 0.8 to 0.9 
where they are smoother, they have very similar shape as the costs of bailouts. The 
reason for asset relief to prove much more efficient for the calibrated model than for 
the simulations is that in case of the simulations, interbank assets formed a larger 
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portion of total assets of the system and hence the liquidity effects were not as strong 
as in the calibrated case.  
Finally, as in the fifth chapter, we briefly mention the cost efficiency of the individual 
measures. In line with the previous analyses, Figure 38 depicts that while guarantees 
are relatively very inefficient, both bailouts and asset purchases are a relevant tool for 
crisis mitigation. As mentioned, this is caused by the liquidity channel, which is not 
addressed by the guarantees measure. Regarding the distinction between bailouts and 
asset relief, bailouts are more efficient in lower alpha, lower support intensity setting 
where they address the pure credit links among individual banking subsectors (that is 
why even guarantees are more efficient in this area). Moreover, at the peak alpha and 
peak support intensity, bailouts are also slightly more efficient than asset relief.  
6.3.3 Feedback Loops 
Finally, we implement the feedback loops of risk transmission back from the 
sovereigns to the banking system and study the effects of state aid on the complete 
model. The figures on the following pages depict the number of failed banking 
systems in dependence on state aid intensity and accounting for different levels of 
CDS sensitivity. 
First, Figure 39 demonstrates the effects of bailouts and recapitalization. We see that 
the measure has large impact on the banking system stability, which may be both 
positive and negative depending on the initially shocked bank and CDS sensitivity 
setting. Generally, setting CDS sensitivity equal to zero represents a situation in 
which the sovereigns are not negatively affected by the state aid as increases in their 
deficits do not result in growth of their CDS spreads and hence also growth of their 
implied probabilities of default. With non-zero CDS sensitivities,25 the feedback loops 
are in their full function as higher deficit resulting from the state aid increases the 
default probabilities of sovereigns. In case of bailouts and recapitalization, when the 
CDS sensitivity is set to zero, the count of failed banks is a decreasing function of the 
support intensity.  
  
                                         
25 Our choice of CDS sensitivity values of 1.5 and 3 in the figures is in line with econometric studies 
such as Sand (2012) or Cottarelli & Jaramillo (2012). 
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Figure 39: Bailouts and recapitalization with feedback loops on the calibrated model 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 40: Guarantees execution with feedback loops on the calibrated model 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 41: Asset relief with feedback loops on the calibrated model 
 
Source: Author 
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For large banking systems (France, Germany, the United States and the United 
Kingdom, having high systemic importance in Figure 33), the effects come only at 
relatively high support intensity as the systemic break-down is prevented only at 
bailouts ratio exceeding 50%. Moreover, for these countries’ banks, the number of 
defaults is never significantly higher with the state support than without it, even 
though at CDS sensitivities of 1.5 and 3 the positive effects come much later at 
higher support intensity levels. This fact corresponds with Figure 21A where we 
showed that for low-capitalized systems the state support almost always  has a 
positive effect on an otherwise collapsing system and we saw in Figure 33 that hitting 
initially these four countries results in the worst crises. Moving to other banking 
systems, we see that at non-zero CDS sensitivities, the default count usually increases 
in the middle of the support intensity interval as the state aid is still insufficient to 
significantly support the banks but already weakens the sovereigns. This pattern is 
visible throughout the majority of the initially-hit banking systems. Also, even at 
non-zero CDS sensitivity levels, in case of almost all initial propagators, the system is 
better off with full state support than without it. The only exception is Belgium, 
Brazil and Greece, where state support clearly worsens the systemic crisis. The 
reason is that they are neither too large nor too interconnected systems and 
supporting them after they are initially hit only adds another channel of contagion 
through a sovereign crisis. 
Second, Figure 40 depicts the effects of guarantees execution. It confirms our 
previous finding that in the current setting where the liquidity channel is the main 
determinant of systemic stability, this measure does not have as large positive effect 
as the previous one. While for zero CDS sensitivity level, it supports the system in 
case of several initial propagators such as Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom or the United States, for non-zero CDS sensitivities the effect is 
usually either neutral or negative. The reason why the guarantees are not a good 
support measure under this calibration setting is that they come into effect only after 
the shock hits the receiver banking system. Hence, even though the credit shocks 
from this banking system onto the others are mitigated, this measure does not 
prevent the liquidation of the receiver banks triggering a systemic collapse through 
the liquidity channel. The only exception is when we initially hit Danish banks. As 
we saw in Figure 32 in case of Denmark, the pure credit contagion channel is more 
pronounced and thus in Figure 40 we see that it is the initial propagator where for 
non-zero CDS sensitivities the effect of guarantees execution on the global banking 
system is significantly positive. 
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Third, Figure 41 shows the effect of asset relief. In case of zero CDS sensitivity, the 
positive effects of this measure are less significant than in the case of bailouts. On the 
other hand, as the CDS sensitivity progresses to higher values, the situation stays 
very similar and thus for high CDS sensitivity cases, this measure would seem as the 
most fitting one. However, we suppose that this result is somewhat biased because of 
the dataset employed. First, high portion of external assets in the system results in 
overestimating the measure’s effectiveness. Moreover, the linkages between sovereigns 
and their non-domestic banks form a minor portion of the total sovereign assets and 
each country’s banking system is aggregated into a single agent. As a result, even 
though the sovereign which is performing the asset relief programme is severely 
weakened, its default affects mainly its already failed domestic banking system. If an 
interbank dataset that more precisely captures the reality was available, we expect 
this measure to perform significantly worse than bailouts and recapitalization. 
6.3.4 Results Summary 
For the empirical analysis we calibrated our model to 4Q 2011 data collected from 
several sources. We found that majority of the total assets in the system are 
constituted by external assets, which hints that our results are different from those of 
Chan-Lau (2010) who considers solely the interbank network documented by the BIS 
data, forming only 8% of the global banking system. 
When the liquidity channel is switched off, the system is relatively stable and not 
vulnerable to systemic crises. The only banking systems which may fail due to 
contagion effects are Greece, which defaults when France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Turkey or the United Kingdom are initially shocked and Sweden, which fails when 
Denmark is hit at the beginning of the simulations. When the liquidity channel is 
switched on, the situation is the same except for the situation when Danish banks are 
initially hit, which results in default of both banking systems of Sweden and Greece. 
When the initial shock is smaller and thus the failing banks have more assets to 
liquidate, the liquidity contagion channel is activated in full force, triggering systemic 
crisis in case of default of French, German, Italian, UK or US banks. Finally, when 
considering an average across various values of local shock, we may categorize the 
countries according to their systemic importance as shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Systemic importance and weakness of individual banking systems 
Country  Systemic importance: Imminent systemic weakness26
Australia  Mild      Medium     
Austria  Low      Mild     
Belgium  Low      High     
Brazil  Low      Low     
Canada  Mild      Low     
Denmark  Mild      High     
France  High      Medium     
Germany  High      Medium     
Greece  Low      High     
Ireland  Low      Medium     
Italy  Medium      Low     
Japan  Medium      Mild     
Netherlands  Mild      High     
Portugal  Low      Medium     
Spain  Medium      Mild     
Sweden  Mild      High     
Switzerland  Mild      High     
Turkey  Low      Low     
United Kingdom  High      Mild     
United States  High      Low     
Source: Author 
Note: The dot sign “” represents the degree of systemic importance or systemic weakness 
Considering the cost and effect of the individual support measures on the calibrated 
system, we found that in line with the simulations, the most efficient measure is 
bailouts and recapitalization. However, as due to the asset structure the liquidity 
channel is the most important one and the BIS data provide insight only into 
aggregated interbank exposures, asset relief is the second-most efficient measure. 
Also, guarantees execution has only slight positive effect on the systemic stability and 
in line with the Monte Carlo simulations, the effects of funding liquidity provision 
proved insignificant. 
Finally, implementing the feedback loops we found that a measure’s real efficiency 
depends on the measure intensity and CDS sensitivity, i.e. the market perception of 
the increase in sovereign risk. These effects were the most pronounced in case of 
bailouts and recapitalization, which according to our simulations may significantly 
improve the systemic stability. However, with higher CDS sensitivity, it depends on 
which country is initially hit: in case of banking systems that are systemically 
important, bailouts are effective throughout the whole support intensity interval, 
whereas for the banks with lower systemic importance, the support may actually 
                                         
26 Imminent systemic weakness represents the relative probability that the given banking system 
defaults in the first contagion lap according to Figure 34. 
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worsen the situation. Table 8 provides the complete overview of the feedback loops 
analysis. 




 At zero CDS sensitivity, the count of failed banks is a decreasing function of support 
intensity on its whole interval 
 At higher CDS sensitivities and in the middle of the support intensity interval, the 
effects are:  
- Negative when the initially failed bank has lower systemic importance 
- Neutral when the initially shocked bank is systemically important, the 
effects come in the second half of the support intensity interval 
 At full support intensity, the measure has a positive effect for all countries except for 
Belgium, Brazil and Greece 
Guarantees 
execution 
 At zero CDS sensitivity, this measure has a significantly positive effect only in a small 
number of cases  
 At non-zero CDS sensitivity levels, the effect of this measure is neutral or positive 
with the only exception of the Danish banks being the target of the initial shock  
Asset relief 
 Efficient at the whole support intensity interval  
 At zero CDS sensitivity the effects are less pronounced than in case of bailouts but 
still significant 
 At non-zero CDS sensitivity levels,  the positive effects stay significant 
 The model is likely to overestimate this measure’s efficiency due to the dataset 
employed. However, currently there is no better data on interbank exposures available 
Funding liquidity 
provision 
 No significantly positive effects found in the previous analyses 
Source: Author 
6.3.5 Further Research Opportunities 
This section provides possible further extensions and improvements of our model or 
the calibration dataset. First, the scope of this thesis did not allow us to observe in 
detail the effects of all parameters already programmed in the model. Comprehensive 
study of the effects of liquidity, the number of banks and sovereigns in the system, 
percentages of interbank or sovereign assets, recovery rates or different levels of 
global and sovereign shocks will be examined in our further research. Moreover, for 
the Monte Carlo simulations, different network topologies may be implemented to 
build structures that better correspond to reality such as small-world or tiered scale 
free networks.  
Second, for the simulations on the calibrated model, we may run the analyses on 
data for other time periods than the currently employed dataset of 4Q 2011. At the 
time of writing this thesis, the latest available BIS interbank exposure data was for 
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3Q 2012 but other data needed for complete calibration of the model was not yet 
available for 2012.  
Third, we saw that the interbank and sovereign assets in the network form only a 
small fraction of total assets and the rest of the assets were classified as external. We 
believe that the BIS exposure data do not provide a full picture of the real sovereign 
and interbank linkages. For this reason, we will focus our next research on obtaining 
more complete dataset that would break a significant part of the external assets 
down into details and reclassify them as interbank or sovereign assets. For example, 
data on TARGET2 balances or derivatives exposures may be added into the model 
instead of treating them as external. We suppose that getting the full picture of the 
global banking system will be progressively easier as the trend of open data and 
higher transparency is finally arriving to banking and the BIS is planning to 
significantly improve its International Banking Statistics database (BCBS, 2012). 
Fourth, another issue with the dataset is that it represents aggregated banking 
systems instead of individual banks. To tackle this, we plan to test our model on a 
sample of real-world banks for which it is possible to construct an interbank exposure 
network based on a probability map. This approach is in line with the recent research 
of the ECB (Halaj & Sorensen, 2013), who constructed such network for the banks 
that reported during the 2010 and 2011 EBA stress tests. 
Finally, because of the agent-based modelling approach, we may extend our model 
with other features such as endogenous network creation or other types of financial 
market agents such as large multinational institutions, pension funds, insurance 
companies27 or even individual depositors. Moreover, we may add the real economy 
along with its input/output flows and observe the effects on individual sectors when 
one sector is hit by a credit crunch or a drop in output. 
                                         
27 Shortly, we assume a stronger interconnectedness between banks and insurers in the EU as a result of 
Basel III and Solvency II requirements. We predict that in the years to come, the situation of many EU 
banks will deteriorate because of their weak balance sheets and the expected problems in the Eurozone. 





The current financial crisis pointed out the importance of the link between the 
financial and the sovereign sector. The first phase is characteristic with risk build-up 
connected to banking deregulation after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
when the banks started racing for leverage. In the second phase, after the 
unsustainability of this setting surfaced and the crisis broke out, the sovereigns 
started playing an active role through several types of measures for financial system 
support, such as bailouts and recapitalization, state guarantees, asset relief or 
provision of funding liquidity. In the third phase, however, it became obvious that the 
risks did not disappear but instead, they were transferred to the sovereigns. As a 
result, sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads rose and the access to new funding 
became increasingly more expensive. As the sovereigns found themselves in crisis 
with their balance sheets deteriorating, the risk returned back into the financial 
system through feedback loop channels, such as the banks holding a large portion of 
sovereign debt. 
To be able to better understand the effects and implications of these interlinkages, in 
this thesis we built an agent-based network model of an artificial financial system, 
which is suitable for stress testing of banks, determining the ideal parameters of 
banking regulation and perhaps most importantly for testing the effects of the four 
individual types of state support in the short as well as in the longer run. 
Subsequently, we performed two analyses on this model: in the first one, we tested 
the individual parameters in Monte Carlo simulations, and in the second one, we 
calibrated the model to the real-word data collected from various sources. 
The first analysis supports all our three hypotheses. In the short term or when the 
feedback loop is not yet active, all the support measures improve the systemic 
stability. When the feedback loops are implemented, the effects of state support 
depend on several parameters: there are settings in which it significantly mitigates 
the systemic crisis and settings in which it contribute to the systemic collapse. 
Finally, there are differences among the measure types. While bailouts and 





The second analysis performed on the calibrated model pointed out the shortcomings 
of studies that examine the systemic stability only on the BIS interbank network 
data such as Chan-Lau (2010), as this dataset amounts only to a small fraction of the 
total banking assets. It stressed the need for deeper analysis and more data 
availability on the structure of the interbank and state-bank exposures. Running the 
simulations, we saw that given our calibration dataset, the market liquidity is the 
most important contagion channel and we were able to classify banking systems 
according to their systemic importance and weakness. Testing the support measures, 
we again found out that in the short run without the feedback loops, state aid may 
significantly support the system and in the longer run with the feedback loop effects, 
it may be effective or harmful depending on the system’s parameters. Moreover, the 
results are indeed different for each individual type of state aid. 
Finally, it is important to stress out the flexibility and extensibility of our modelling 
approach, which may lead to many more conclusions. For example, in the future we 
may calibrate it to the increasingly available and more complete real world data or 
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Figure 42: Illustration of the application’s GUI 
  
 




Figure 43: Illustration of the application’s output file 
$$$ BankNet v2.1 
 
############################################################################## 
###   PURPOSE:  Testing sovereign defaults 
############################################################################## 




###   *** PARAMETERS ***   ################################################### 
###   ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
###    ;node_count: ;;;1;1;25;;fixed 25 
###    ;connectivity: ;;;0;10;0.1;;VARIABLE 
###    ;sovereign_count: ;;;1;1;5;;fixed 5 
###    ;external_assets_sum: ;;;1;1;100000;;fixed 100000 
###    ;sovereign_debt_sum: ;;;0;10;10000;;VARIABLE 
###    ;internal_assets_ratio: ;;;1;1;0.4;;fixed 0.4 
###    ;init_capital_ratio: ;;;0;15;0.1;;VARIABLE 
###    ;alpha: ;;;0;15;0.1;;VARIABLE 
###    ;funding_shock_ratio: ;;;0;1;1;;VARIABLE 
###    ;M2M ratio: ;;;1;1;1;;fixed 1 
###    ;local_shock: ;;;1;1;1;;fixed 1 
###    ;global_shock: ;;;1;1;0;;fixed 0 
###    ;sovereign_shock: ;;;0;10;0.1;;VARIABLE 
###    ;SHOCK TYPE: ;;;;SOVEREIGN SHOCK 
###    ;K1: ;;;0;0;0;;fixed 0 
###    ;K2: ;;;0;0;0;;fixed 0 
###    ;K3: ;;;0;0;0;;fixed 0 
###    ;K4: ;;;0;0;0;;fixed 0 
###    ;probability_adj: ;;;0;0;0;;fixed 0 
###    ;init_CDS_spread: ;;;0;0;0;;fixed 0 
###    ;recovery_rate: ;;;0;0;0;;fixed 0 
###    ;CDS_sensitivity: ;;;0;0;0;;fixed 0 
###   ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
###    Number of simulations for each parameter set: 200 
############################################################################## 
Capital ratio;Internal assets ratio;Funding shock ratio;Alpha;Connectivity;M2M 
ratio;Bank count;Sovereign count;External assets total;Sovereign debt total;Local 
shock;Global shock;Sovereign shock;K1 AR;K2 GE;K3 BR;K4 FLP;Probability adj;CDS 
















###   ends after  681472 iterations. 
############################################################################## 
###   ++END++ time and date:   (04-21__13,23,42)    (started 04-20__04,20,18) 
############################################################################## 
Source: Author 
Note: This figure presents the format in which data is collected from the model. After stripping 
the file of its header and footer, the middle part is a semicolon-separated data table which may be 
imported to MS Excel or any statistical software. The three grey dots in the figure represent the 
data in the middle of the table – for large simulations, the output may be a file reaching tens or 







Figure 44: Number of simulation laps for individual support measures 
Panel A: Bailouts and recapitalization Panel B: Guarantees execution   
 









Figure 45: Number of simulation laps for individual support measures with feedback loops 
Panel A: Bailouts ratio vs. Capital ratio Panel B: Bailouts ratio vs. Connectivity 
Panel A: Guarantees ratio vs. Capital ratio Panel B: Guarantees ratio vs. Connectivity 





Figure 46: Positions of selected banking systems as of Q3 2012 
Panel A: Q3 2012 
 
Panel A: Q4 2008 
 
Panel A: Q4 2006 
 




Figure 47: Interbank lending snapshots in selected years 
Panel A: Q3 2012, Edge colours according to creditor node Panel B: Q3 2012, Edge colours according to debtor node 
Panel C: Q4 2008, Edge colours according to creditor node Panel D: Q4 2008, Edge colours according to debtor node 
Panel E: Q4 2006, Edge colours according to creditor node Panel F: Q4 2006, Edge colours according to debtor node 




Figure 48: Development of selected banking systems’ positions 
 
Source: Author 
